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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
he financial crisis has posed an enormous challenge for the EU’s state 
aid regime. Conceived to ensure a level playing field in the single 
market, the scheme also had to show that it could be adapted to 
exceptional circumstances. The size and nature of the aid, the number of 
the schemes and the complexity of the cases that had to be examined and 
approved were overwhelming. Although some high-profile cases of bank 
state aid had been dealt with by the European Commission in the past, 
never in the EU’s half-century of history had the European Commission 
dealt with so many cases in such a short period of time. The approach 
followed during this period will thus continue to influence policy-making 
for a long time to come. 
During the crisis, 20 bank debt guarantee and 15 bank recapitalisation 
schemes and 44 cases of individual bank aid cases were dealt with by the 
European Commission under the state aid rules. At the height of the crisis, 
the effectively committed aid amounted to some 13% of the GDP of the EU. 
The final amount may be lower, however, as the biggest part of aid was 
granted in guarantees of bank liabilities, which disappear as soon as soon 
as the guarantee is withdrawn, and the aid is remunerated, provided the 
financial system stabilises.  
During 2008-09, the European Commission gave guidance to the 
private sector about its policy in applying state aid rules to the financial 
sector. The EU published four Communications, but it remains an open 
question whether this was the appropriate way to proceed, and how closely 
this policy was applied in practice. Considering the approach taken in 
specific state aid cases, it seems that the policy followed was more ad hoc. 
Some general principles were followed, including new conditions that had 
not been applied before, but it seems that the end result, certainly at 
European level, is a more uneven playing field. Some member states’ banks 
were in better shape when the crisis hit, but some states were also better 
prepared to respond to the crisis and to make their state aid schemes 
compatible with EU rules. Different forms of restructuring packages were 
thus not necessarily only bank-specific, but also country-specific. 
The legal provisions of the EU framework to assess state aid are 
unique. The EU is the only international entity with real powers to assess 
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aid and its distortions to competition and trade, and to enforce remedies, 
but its framework is limited to aid given by EU member states. Beyond 
that, the EU needs to rely on international agreements, most importantly 
the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which are 
much weaker than the existing provisions in the EU, and without having 
developed any case law so far.  
This report is a distillation of the discussions held within the CEPS 
Task Force on Bank State Aid in the Financial Crisis. The report puts 
forward the following nine recommendations.  
Recommendations 
1.  A comprehensive view is needed on the role played by state aid 
during the financial crisis. The financial system was rescued thanks to 
the concerted efforts of governments, central banks and international 
authorities. But coordination needs to be enhanced inside the 
European Commission and with the member states, as the crisis has 
provoked a number of responses, of which state aid is only one. A 
bigger role could have been played by the EU Council and the 
European Parliament in coordinating the response, and in ensuring a 
more homogeneous policy, in establishing a special procedure for this 
unprecedented situation.  
2.  A higher level of awareness is needed within the member states of 
the application of the EU’s state aid policies. An ex-post analysis 
seems to indicate that some member states were more aware of the 
state aid rules than others in the design of the bank rescue packages, 
resulting in a more uneven playing field after than before the crisis. 
3.  As the recovery was the result of a joint effort between states, central 
banks and the EU authorities, the exit strategy should also be 
carefully planned among these actors. As far as possible, the exit 
strategies should also be coordinated with the overall economic 
recovery strategies of member states. This is particularly true for state 
aid policy. 
4.  Cross-border coordination of the reduction of state aid support 
measures should be mainly pursued for those elements that are most 
distorting, i.e. different forms and degrees of support for bank debt. 
However, considering that the quality of the guarantor and size of the 
problem differs considerably across EU member states, and continues BANK STATE AID IN THE FINANCIAL CRISIS | iii 
 
to differ as the economic circumstances differ, a more pronounced 
coordination may be very difficult to achieve.  
5.  Greater openness is needed in state aid processes. A broader 
involvement of stakeholders in the consultation on the general policy 
of state aid and in specific cases would be useful. At the moment, 
there is no genuine and systematic consultation at EU level.  
6.  The EU should continue to analyse the impact of the aid and its 
various measures on the level playing field. An overall ex-post 
assessment of the crisis, of the state aid given to the financial sector, 
and of the EU’s policy response is therefore needed. Following Treaty 
Art. 108.1, the Commission has a duty to monitor the implementation 
of its decisions. 
7.  There is an uneven playing field at the international level, with the 
European Commission scrutinising aid by the member states to 
European banks, while nothing comparable exists elsewhere. A 
framework is in place at the WTO level, but it is very rudimentary 
compared to the EU scheme, and leaves huge scope for carve-outs. 
EU banks may thus also be disadvantaged internationally by the tight 
EU regime. 
8.  At the global level, the London and Pittsburgh G-20 summits stated 
the importance of “cooperative and coordinated exit strategies”. 
However, given the above, this seems very difficult to implement in 
practice. A mechanism is needed to facilitate multilateral 
coordination of exit strategies, which permits adjustment in the 
interest of fair competition. One international organisation should be 
mandated to act.  
9.  In the future, a European crisis management and resolution 
framework should be considered in order to deal with banks in 
trouble, but any proposed resolution or authority must integrate and 
clearly specify the EU’s state aid rules and objectives of 
proportionality, necessity and focus. The involvement of the 
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and European Banking 
Authority (EBA) in such a new framework would be essential. | 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
ontrol of state aid is a core EU task, enshrined in the EU Treaty from 
the start. Its objective is to ensure that government interventions do 
not distort competition and trade inside the EU. State aid is defined 
as an advantage in any form whatsoever conferred on a selective basis to 
undertakings by national public authorities. Subsidies granted to 
individuals or general measures open to all enterprises are not covered by 
Art. 107 of the EU Treaty (TFEU) and do not constitute state aid.  
The EC Treaty pronounces a general prohibition of state aid. In some 
circumstances, however, government interventions can be permitted. These 
concern regional development, response to serious economic disturbances, 
and aid to economic sectors in trouble. The European Commission has the 
sole competence to decide when state aid can be permitted. The Treaty 
provides that all new aid measures must be notified and approved by the 
European Commission prior to their implementation; if not, the aid is 
invalid. It is only after the approval by the Commission that an aid measure 
can be implemented. Incompatible state aid can be recovered. The 
Commission can be overruled by the EU Council of Ministers, which can 
decide, acting unanimously, that aid is compatible with the single market, 
in derogation from the provisions of Art. 107. 
Until the crisis hit, the experience of applying state aid rules to the 
financial sector was limited to a few, but high profile cases. The best known 
cases involved Crédit Lyonnais and the German regional banks ruling. In 
the former case, the European Commission decided in 1995 that Crédit 
Lyonnais, in return for receiving the green light on the €6.9 billion (FF45 
billion) in state aid, had to reduce its commercial operations abroad, 
including a substantial part of its European banking network, by at least 
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35% by the end of 1998.1 In the German Landesbank case, the European 
Commission agreed with the German government in 2001 and 2002 to 
abolish the system of state guarantees for Landesbanken and savings banks 
and to distinguish between the public policy and purely commercial tasks 
of these institutions. The continuing use of state guarantees was allowed 
for public policy tasks such as financing of SMEs, infrastructure, 
investments for environmental protection, housing and cooperation with 
developing countries.2  
Some have argued that the EU’s state aid rules are not entirely 
appropriate for the banking sector, because of its special nature (Grande, 
1999). Public subsidies may be needed in the banking sector to achieve the 
objectives pursued by regulation and supervision, and may not necessarily 
distort competition. When combating systemic risk, state aid is used to 
prevent a serious disruption of the financial system, and of the overall 
economy. In addition, the aid may be granted through special liquidity 
support by the central bank. Hence the overall public interest is at stake, 
not simply a private one. This public interest is essentially monitored by 
national supervisory authorities and central banks, implying that the 
control of state aid, when related to supervisory and systemic stability 
issues, should be in their hands.  
The outbreak of the financial crisis forced policy-makers to come to 
terms with a calamity – the proportion of which they could not have 
imagined before, and to which they had to respond rapidly. For 
comparison, the overall level of state aid granted in the EU between 2002 
and 2007, expressed as a percentage of GDP, decreased on average by 
around 2% per year and stood at less than 0.5% in 2007 (European 
Commission, 2009d). 
This report analyses, from different perspectives, the huge amounts 
of aid that were given to the financial sector. Section I offers an overview of 
bank state aid policy during the crisis. It demonstrates that there are vast 
differences in the way member states have offered and implemented aid to 
the financial sector and that these differing policies have called the 
coherence of the single market into question.  
                                                      
1 European Commission, 95/547/EC of 26.07.1995. 
2 European Commission, Decisions of 17 July 2001 and 1 March 2002. BANK STATE AID IN THE FINANCIAL CRISIS | 3 
 
Section II discusses the approach followed by the European 
Commission on the basis of the competences foreseen in the EU Treaty and 
poses some alternative options. It addresses the question of whether the 
European Commission is pursuing an industrial policy through its state aid 
decisions. 
Section III of this report examines state aid in the global context. It 
questions whether existing international tools for ensuring a level playing 
field for banks are sufficient, given the global nature of the industry. 
Conclusions from this section demonstrate that global standards on aid to 
the financial sector are underdeveloped. 4 | 
 
 
I.  AN OVERVIEW OF STATE AID 
PROVIDED DURING THE CRISIS 
he EU’s state aid policy for the financial sector was not challenged 
during the first year of the financial crisis (August 2007-August 
2008). It was only in the aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
in September 2008 and after the special Eurogroup meeting in Paris on 12 
October 2008 that its application was temporarily relaxed to deal with the 
extraordinary circumstances in financial markets. In the absence of a 
European bail-out plan, the October 12th Eurogroup meeting decided that: 
-  Governments can provide state guarantees to bank debt issues for up 
to five years under well-determined conditions, and can participate in 
these issues. All banks should be eligible for these operations, 
including foreign-owned banks; and 
-  Governments can take equity stakes in financial institutions and 
recapitalise banks in trouble. 
The Eurogroup requested that governments avoid national measures 
that would negatively affect the functioning of the internal market and 
harm other member states. The Eurogroup committed to “coordinate in 
providing these guarantees, as significant differences in national 
implementation could have a counter-productive effect, creating distortions 
in banking markets”. The support actions would be “designed in order to 
avoid any distortion in the level playing field and possible abuse at the 
expense of the non-beneficiaries of these arrangements”.3  
The Eurogroup suggested that the European Central Bank (ECB) 
should fulfil its role in assuring sufficient liquidity for the financial sector 
                                                      
3 Eurogroup meeting, 12 October 2008, pp. 2-3. 
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and reacts with flexibility to market circumstances. In particular, the ECB 
was asked to ease its rules on assets that qualify as collateral in liquidity-
providing operations, on which the central bank acted a few days later. 
From that moment on, the ECB dramatically expanded the eligibility 
criteria of marketable and non-marketable assets, including the lowering of 
the credit threshold for these assets from an A- to a BBB- credit assessment 
by an eligible External Credit Assessment Institution (ECAI) or rating 
agent.4  
The Eurogroup’s decisions were later endorsed by the autumn 
European Council (October 2008), which broadened their application to the 
EU as a whole. The European Council endorsed a flexible interpretation of 
the EU’s state aid rules, given the exceptional circumstances.5 EU leaders 
allowed bank state aid so as to restore financial stability and resume credit 
flows. 
Hence, to have a correct picture of ‘state’ support during the crisis, 
the different actions must be seen in combination. Enhanced credit support 
by the European Central Bank and quantitative easing by the Bank of 
England could also be considered as a subsidy to the financial system, but 
are not considered as such under the EU’s state aid rules. The full list of 
elements comprises: 
-  Government: financial sector stabilisation measures 
o  Equity capital support 
o  Debt support  
  participation in debt issues 
  underwriting of subordinated debt 
  guarantee of bank deposits 
  overall guarantee of bank liabilities 
  guarantees for interbank lending and bank bonds 
o  Short-term liquidity support 
o  Support for impaired assets in asset support programmes and ‘bad 
bank’ schemes 
                                                      
4 ECB, “Measures to further expand the collateral framework”, Press release, 15 
October 2008. 
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-  Central bank: monetary policy and liquidity support 
o  Enhanced credit support, composed of full allotment, expansion of 
eligible collateral, longer-term credit provision and direct purchases 
of securities (quantitative easing) 
Figure 1 clearly shows that the policy was successful for the 
eurozone. The enormous spread between the 3-month euribor and the 
ECB’s main refinancing rate was gradually narrowed as a result of the 
exceptional measures agreed upon at the Eurogroup meeting. It is thus the 
combination of state aid, the ECB’s monetary policy and enhanced credit 
support that stabilised the situation.  
Figure 1. Evolution of the ECB’s refinancing rate and 3-month Euribor 
(Jan 2007- early 2010) 
ECB: short-term interest rates
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The 3-month Euribor stabilised at 0.7% in the last quarter of 2009, or 
well below the ECB main refinancing rate of 1%, which indicates that 
liquidity is abundant. This already underscores the difficulty of defining 
and implementing exit policies. Indeed, the ECB needs to ensure some 
coordination with other European and national authorities when it starts 
reducing liquidity in its credit support operations, as difficult as this may 
be to reconcile with its independence.6  
                                                      
6 The ECB intended to start reducing the eligible collateral in credit providing 
operations, but the Greek budget crisis in early 2010 forced it to delay this measure. 
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The intervention of the ECB contrasted, at least in the initial phase, 
with those of other central banks, in particular with the Fed and the Bank of 
England, which were more active in the direct purchase of securities with 
the so-called ‘quantitative easing’ schemes. In addition, asset support and 
debt guarantee programmes were more extensive in the US and the UK 
than in the eurozone, in the sense that a distinction could be made between 
the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ world and continental Europe in the response to the 
crisis. According to numbers released by the Bank of England, state 
support for the financial sector, including central bank assistance, was up 
to 74% of GDP in the UK, 48% in the US, compared to 28% in the eurozone. 
This has changed with the sovereign debt crisis of the first half of 2010, 
although it is too early to have a clear view on the costs.  
Figure 2. State support for the financial sector 
 
                                                                                                                                       
Greek government paper is rated BBB- (Fitch, S&P), which would have curtailed 
access of Greek banks to the ECB’s liquidity providing operations. See: ECB press 
release, 3 May 2010 
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Source: Bank of England (2009). 
Types of state aid 
State aid to the financial sector can be offered in four main forms. First, 
governments can guarantee  bank deposits, banks bonds or all bank 
liabilities. As deposit guarantees schemes are designed for retail depositors 
and limited to a fixed maximum amount, they do not raise a state aid issue. 
To the extent that the deposit protection fund is used to bail out a bank, as 
happened in the Banesto (1993) and Banco di Sicilia (1995) cases, the EU’s 
state aid rules apply. Deposit protection can be extended to cover a broader 
set of bank liabilities so as to prevent gridlock in the financial system, as 
was done in Ireland in the Eligible Liabilities Guarantee scheme.7 
Governments can also specifically guarantee certain bank loans and bonds 
to maintain the ability of banks to raise funds. Such guarantees should be 
remunerated. 
States can provide equity  support to strengthen the capital base of 
financial institutions. In recapitalisation programmes, governments inject 
funds into banks in exchange for direct equity, preferred shares or 
subordinated debt (as a form of hybrid capital). In a situation of serious 
distress, as the financial crisis, banks may need new capital, which will be 
difficult or impossible due to market uncertainty. Recapitalising banks can 
improve the functioning and stability of the banking system and maintain 
financing flows to the wider economy.  
A special form to absorb losses in the financial system is the creation 
of a so-called bad bank. In a bad bank, banks get a delay to reimburse their 
creditors until the financial system normalises, and assets recover. It could 
thus be considered as a form of Chapter 11, with the understanding that 
bad banks are separate legal entities. Bad banks can be private, held by the 
bank in trouble (see the German bad bank scheme in Annex 4) or by the 
banking sector at large, or they can be owned by the state. Relieving 
financial institutions of impaired assets can help a bank strengthen its 
balance sheet, re-gain access to liquidity, and reduce leverage. Bad bank 
schemes raise fundamental competition policy problems, however, related 
to determining the new book value of the impaired assets, tackling the 
distortions created by the schemes and justifying the scheme to taxpayers 
                                                      
7 See European Commission, State aid case N 254/2010 of 16.06.2010. BANK STATE AID IN THE FINANCIAL CRISIS | 9 
 
when public money is used to pay for bad assets to banks in trouble, as was 
the case in Ireland.  
The final form of state aid is the nationalisation of banks. Under a 
nationalisation programme, a large part of or all assets are taken over by 
the state. Nationalisation itself is not a form of state aid – the EU Treaty is 
neutral with regard to the form of ownership – it is the capital injection in a 
bank in trouble that forms state aid. In most cases, the goal of 
nationalisation is to return the bank to health with the objective of one day 
returning it to the private sector.  
Indirect state support to the financial system 
Central banks can indirectly ‘aid’ banks through the conditions of the 
liquidity-providing operations. In normal circumstances, central banks 
control money supply through the central interest rate on credit for the 
banking sector. Banks can access liquidity in exchange for collateral. In 
normal circumstances, eligible collateral is limited to high-quality 
securities, on which a haircut is applied. The ECB for example applies a 
fixed valuation haircut of up to 5% on 10-year government bonds 
(declining with maturity), or up to 14% for asset backed securities. To cope 
with market fluctuations, margin calls are applied by the ECB. During the 
financial crisis, the ECB lowered its conditions for acceptable collateral 
from A- to BBB-, without changing the valuation haircuts. This implies that 
securities may well have been accepted by the central bank with valuation 
haircuts that were above the market price at a given moment, allowing 
banks to arbitrage. It is unclear whether the margin calls have been fully 
applied in the volatile financial market context of the last two years, or 
whether they have been utilised for less marketable financial instruments.8 
In its most extreme form, central banks can buy assets directly in the 
markets at distressed prices to inject liquidity and trust into the financial 
system (‘quantitative easing’), as was widely carried out in the UK and the 
US. These operations artificially shore up the value of the assets, and are a 
                                                      
8 The liquidity categories of the valuation haircuts were changed in September 2008 
and the valuation haircuts increased in July 2010. See latest changes to risk control 
measures in Eurosystem credit operations, European Central Bank, Press notices, 4 
September 2008 and 28 July 2010. For the changes as a result of the crisis, see ECB 
press release, 15 October 2008. 10 | AN OVERVIEW OF STATE AID PROVIDED DURING TH E CRISIS 
 
clear form of indirect state support to the financial system. Quantitative 
easing, however, is risky and may affect the capital base of the central 
banks.  
Within EMU, direct aid by central banks to the financial system is 
forbidden by the Treaty. In the case of Fortis, however, the Belgian central 
bank (NBB) gave emergency liquidity assistance of €60 billion, which had 
to be specifically authorised by the ESCB.9 
EU state aid policy during the crisis 
The remainder of this report will focus solely on direct state aid during the 
crisis, which posed a fundamental challenge for the application of the EU’s 
competition policy rules. The announcement of the Irish Credit Institutions 
Financial Support scheme on 27 September 2008 was the first of a cascade 
of national bail-out plans, all of which raised to a greater or lesser degree 
single market competition policy problems. From the early days of the 
financial crisis in the autumn of 2007, the EU continued to apply its state 
aid policy, for example in the Northern Rock, IKB or Sachsen LB cases. 
With the start of the systemic crisis in autumn 2008, it temporarily accepted 
the exceptional circumstances of the crisis and let financial stability 
concerns precede over the strict application of the state aid rules.  
By mid-2010, the European Commission had been notified of 20 state 
debt guarantee and 15 recapitalisation schemes, and 44 specific bank state 
aid cases.10 Thirteen of the old member states (except Belgium and 
Luxembourg) had a national scheme, and seven new member states 
(Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Cyprus). Five 
                                                      
9 Such support can happen in the eurozone on the basis of specific collateral 
requirements, although it is unclear what these were in the case of Fortis. In its 
opinion on the Belgian law on the subject, the ECB stated that the ‘State must 
guarantee to the NBB the repayment of any credit granted in the context of the 
NBB’s contribution to the stability of the financial system and must guarantee the 
NBB against any loss’ as it concerns a form of prohibited monetary financing 
(TFEU Art. 123.1), which affects the independence of the central bank. ECB, 
Opinion of 8 October 2008 on the draft law, (CON/2008/46). 
10 This number counts cases concerning one and the same bank only once. See 
latest Commission note dated 29 June 2010 and recent press releases from DG 
Competition on: http://ec.europa.eu/competition  BANK STATE AID IN THE FINANCIAL CRISIS | 11 
 
EU member states had neither bank support schemes nor individual bank 
support cases, all of these new member states (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Malta and Romania). The national support schemes are in some 
cases limited to guarantees only, but can also comprise recapitalisation or 
bad bank schemes (see Annexes 1, 2 and 5). Germany and the UK had the 
most comprehensive national schemes, whereas Germany also had the 
highest number of individual bank cases (13). At the time of writing, nine 
specific cases were still under formal in-depth investigation, including 
some high-profile cases such as Hypo Real Estate. Since delays occur in the 
publication of detailed conclusions on cases, or not all details are made 
public, information may not have been available at the time of drafting this 
report. 
The total amount of aid granted to the financial sector during the 
crisis added up to €4.1 trillion, one-third of the EU’s GDP. It consists of 
general and ad hoc support for financial institutions, composed of short-
term liquidity support, state guarantees of the interbank market, equity 
(recapitalisation) and debt (subordinated debt) financing, and support for 
bad bank schemes. €1.5 trillion (12.5% of GDP) of this amount has been 
effectively used, a figure that may not grow further, provided the situation 
further stabilises. State guarantees on bank liabilities represent the largest 
budgetary commitment among the aid instruments, with €3.1 trillion (25% 
of EU GDP) of approved measures, out of which €1 trillion (8% of GDP) 
have been effectively granted (see Table 1).11 These guarantees were 
provided in national schemes, with varying legal frameworks and timelines 
(see Annex 2 and 5). As shown in the annex, guarantee schemes differed in 
three respects: the amounts granted, the eligibility of institutions, and the 
conditionality placed on recipients.  
-  In terms of amounts, allowances available ranged from €15 billion 
(Greece) to unlimited (Ireland, Belgium and Denmark). 
-  Eligibility: certain countries were much more restrictive with respect 
to which firms were eligible for guarantees. For example, Ireland 
made allowances available to any financial institution with a systemic 
relevance to the Irish economy. By contrast, the Dutch scheme was 
                                                      
11 The ECB (2010) also published its assumptions on the cost of the financial crisis, 
which are, for the euro area, on the basis of the contingent liabilities, at least 20% of 
GDP. 12 | AN OVERVIEW OF STATE AID PROVIDED DURING TH E CRISIS 
 
open only to those institutions defined as banks and having their 
corporate domicile or substantial operations in the Netherlands, and 
with an acceptable solvency ratio. 
-  Concerning conditionality, while many schemes placed restrictions 
on executive pay, only some placed restrictions on balance sheet 
growth, and fewer made guarantees available only to “fundamentally 
sound institutions”.  
Table 1. Public interventions in the EU banking sector 
in € bn  General 
measures 
(A) 
Ad-hoc 
support 
(B) 
Total 
(C=A+B) 
Effectively 
used 
(D) 
Share 
(D/C) 
% GDP 
(D/GDP) 
Debt guarantee 
schemes 
2,747  402.8  3149.8  993.6  31.5 7.9 
Re-capitalisation 338.2  164.9  503.1  241.6  48.0 1.9 
Support for bad 
asset schemes 
376  54  430  322  74.9 2.6 
Liquidity support  41.9    41.9  41.9  100.0 0.3 
Total 3,503.1  621.7  4,124.8  1,557.2  37.8 12.5 
Note: For country specific data, see European Commission (2009a). 
Source: European Commission (2010). Data up to 31 March 2010. 
 
During the crisis, the European Commission’s Competition 
Directorate published several Communications to try to bring some order 
in the national support schemes. However, the Commission only succeeded 
gradually in doing this, as the crisis receded and the need to preserve the 
single market re-emerged as a policy priority. Issues such as non-
discriminatory access or unjustified protection of shareholders were 
apparent but initially led to no or limited reaction on the part of the EU. In 
total, the European Commission published four Communications (see the 
summary in Annex 3). The first Communication sets out the general 
principles to be respected, the successive ones focus on aspects of it, i.e. the 
required remuneration for state support, the treatment of impaired assets 
and the restructuring plans in the return to viability. Overall, the 
Commission’s objectives are: 
-  to demonstrate a capacity for an effective Community-level response 
to the financial crisis, BANK STATE AID IN THE FINANCIAL CRISIS | 13 
 
-  to limit negative spill-over among member states, 
-  to protect the single market and 
-  to minimise competitive distortions and moral hazard. 
It should be recalled that many of these single market distortions and 
thorny competition policy problems could have been avoided if a 
European-wide bank resolution and crisis management framework had 
been in place.  
The most important document in the context of this report, and the 
future shape of the European banking markets, is the July 2009 
Communication on the return to viability. It states that the Commission 
will examine restructuring plans in view of: 
-  a thorough diagnosis of a bank’s problems. The starting point for a 
viability plan with, where applicable, disclosure of impaired assets 
and off-balance sheet items. 
-  a restructuring plan with a flexible and realistic timing. A viability plan 
requires a stress test. It should demonstrate how the bank will return 
to viability without aid as soon as possible (maximum term is five 
years), giving details per business line on the re-structuring, funding, 
risk controls, governance. It should also analyse alternative 
considered options, such as sale of the bank or break-up. 
-  clear burden-sharing between the member state and beneficiaries. The aid 
should be limited to the minimum necessary, which can include the 
sale of assets, although the Commission acknowledges that absolute 
thresholds cannot be set ex ante. Aid should be remunerated, but 
cannot be used to pay dividends or subordinate debt holders. 
-  measures to limit distortions of competition: These will again be case-
specific or tailor-made, as many elements have to be taken into 
consideration: the survival of the bank, the maintenance of the single 
market, the promotion of competitive markets. State aid cannot be 
used for acquisitions, a condition that applies for at least three years. 
In applying these rules, the European Commission has accepted new 
conditions. It has accepted the recapitalisation of banks during the crisis, 
not only emergency loans and special guarantees. For non-financial 
corporations, the rule is that recapitalisation is only accepted after the 
restructuring. Recapitalisation is also seen as a more permanent measure 
than loans and guarantees, meaning that aid becomes longer-term, and 14 | AN OVERVIEW OF STATE AID PROVIDED DURING TH E CRISIS 
 
thus more permanent, than the state aid rules as applied before. Finally, the 
Commission has also accepted aid schemes, not only individual measures. 
The principles of the return to viability Communication formed the 
basis for the state aid decisions that the European Commission adopted 
from the autumn of 2009 onwards. Although some decisions had been 
taken before, such as with Commerzbank, the Commission aimed to 
indicate that the situation had returned to normal. In announcing the ING, 
KBC and Lloyds Decisions on 18 November 2009, former Competition 
Policy Commissioner Neely Kroes said: “We want to ensure that banks can 
be rebuilt so that they can play their role in helping Europe's economy to 
recover and will not be a long-term burden on Europe's taxpayers.” The 
Commissioner added that the common principles that underpin the 
Commission’s approach to these cases were: 1) long-term business models, 
2) minimisation of taxpayer burdens and 3) the maintenance of the single 
market. The final approval of the measures was conditional upon the 
presentation of a restructuring plan capable of restoring the long-term 
viability of the bank without continued state support.  
The announcement of the Commission Decisions regarding state-
aided banks seemed to have taken markets by surprise, as the stocks of the 
state aid banks fell considerably, depending on the scale of the 
restructuring plan. The share price of ING and Lloyds fell by about 30% in 
the week following the announcement. Markets appeared to be unaware of 
the Commission’s powers to act on state aid, or had simply disregarded 
them. The Commission plan was also a signal to those banks that did not 
benefit from explicit government support during the crisis that the level 
playing field would be restored.  
The agreement between the Commission and the home state of the 
bank in question is specific in each case. The ING announcement that it 
would divest all its insurance and investment management activities – and 
thus end its bank-insurance model – led to speculation that the 
Commission would impose the same conditions on other groups. In the 
KBC case, however, another deal was reached, including the divestment of 
the group’s private banking and private equity business, and the sale of 
non-core activities in Central and Eastern Europe. In the case of Lloyds, 
probably one of the most difficult cases after the takeover of the bankrupt 
HBOS, the Commission took comfort from the sale of a part of the retail 
banking group.  
The Commission applies the following criteria in judging each case:  BANK STATE AID IN THE FINANCIAL CRISIS | 15 
 
-  The aid must be limited to the minimum necessary.  
-  It must be proportional to the contribution made by private share- and 
bondholders. Hence, constraints are imposed on management and 
owners.  
-  The aid must be appropriate and well-targeted. 
-  The aid must be remunerated. 
Applying these criteria in practice is difficult, however. What is the 
strictest minimum for aid? What is proportional? What conditions can be 
imposed on state-aided banks? As Table 2 and Box 1 below demonstrate, 
the European Commission has clearly applied certain principles 
consistently: adequate remuneration, dividend ban, price leadership ban, 
but the degree of downsizing and the core market reduction differs.  
Table 2. Comparing specific state aid decisions of one mid-sized and five large 
cross-border European banks 
 Balance 
sheet total 
(€ bn) 
Burden-sharing Business  reduction 
 2008  2009  Remuneration  Coupon  Core 
market 
Balance 
sheet 
(in %) 
Bans 
Standard rule      -/+ (-)  (-)  50  (-) 
Commerzbank  1046  844  + +/-  -  >45  ++ 
Dexia 651  580  + -  +  >35  ++ 
ING 1331  1164 
 
+ -  +  >45  ++ 
KBC 355  324  + +  +/-  <20  + 
Lloyds (in £)  1127  1027  + +  +  <20  + 
RBS (in £)  2402  1696  + +/-  +  >25  + 
Sources: Nicola Pesaresi, EU Commission; DG Competition, European Commission, State Aid 
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Box 1. Main points of state aid decisions in case of one mid-sized and five large cross-border 
European banks 
Commerzbank 
-  State aid: recapitalisation worth €8.2 billion and a guarantee framework for securities worth 
up to €15 billion (October 2008), additional equity capital totalling €10 billion (January 2009) 
-  internal headcount reduction and restructuring/downsizing programme (45% reduction of 
balance sheet) 
-  divestment of Eurohypo by 2014 at the latest 
-  reduction of investment banking operations and divestment of some entities (Kleinwort 
Benson) 
-  reduced market presence in Central and Eastern Europe 
-  acquisition ban until April 2012 
-  dividend ban (2008-2009) 
-  price leadership ban 
Dexia 
-  State aid: €8.4 billion recapitalisation and guarantee or guaranteed liquidity assistance of €95-
135 billion  
-  domestic (life insurance business, retail branches, bond portfolio) and international (Crediop, 
RCB International, Dexia bank Slovakia, …) divestment programme  
-   35% reduction in Dexia’s balance sheet total by end-2014 compared to end-2008 
-  reduction of short-term funding from 30% of total balance sheet in 2009 to 11% in 2014 
-  reduction of operational costs by 15% by end-2012 
-  dividend ban (until end-2011) 
-  acquisition ban (until end 2011) 
-  advertising restrictions 
-  adherence to G-20 remuneration principles 
ING  
-  State aid: recapitalisation €10 billion and €12 billion of liquidity guarantees (October 2008), 
illiquid asset back-up facility covering 80% of a portfolio of $39 billion (January 2009) 
-  internal headcount reduction and restructuring programme (45% balance sheet reduction) 
-  divestment of several ING insurance brands and complete separation of banking and 
insurance by end 2013 
-  divestment of ING Direct US (considered to be core by the group, but to be divested by 2013) 
-  divestment of new company for Dutch retail financial market (composed of mortgage and 
consumer credit activities) 
-  price leadership ban for the EU for certain retail and SME banking products for three year 
period maximum 
-  acquisition ban for three-year period maximum 
KBC 
-  State aid: a recapitalisation of €3.5 billion (December 2008), a second recapitalisation of 
another €3.5 billion (January 2009) and an asset relief measure on a portfolio containing 
CDOs (May 2009) 
-  divestment of KBL Private Bank BANK STATE AID IN THE FINANCIAL CRISIS | 17 
 
 
 
Given that each of these banks operate with different business models 
and in different circumstances, it is obvious that the outcome of these state 
aid decisions is ‘tailor-made’. Commerzbank and RBS had just engaged in a 
large acquisition before the crisis erupted (Dresdner Bank, respectively 
ABN AMRO’s wholesale banking unit), leading to substantial adjustments. 
However, the large losses were in the RBS case covered by a large 
shareholding of the British state, in the case of Commerzbank through a 
subordinated debt subscription and more limited capital injection by 
-  divestment of non-core activities in Central and Eastern-Europe (Serbia, Slovenia, Russia) 
-  divestment or scaling down a number of specialist investment banking activities, including 
most of the operations of the subsidiary, KBC Financial Products  
-  sale of several complementary distribution channels in Belgium 
-  focus on six home markets in bank-insurance for retail and SMEs in Belgium and five 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe, namely the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, 
Poland and Bulgaria 
-  scaling back a large proportion of the loan portfolios outside the home markets 
-  dividend, acquisition and price leadership ban 
Lloyds 
-  State aid: £17 bn recapitalisation (January 2009) and £5.9 bn (November 2009) 
-  Asset reduction programme (£181 bn by end-2014) 
-  divestment programme of some brands (including TSB) 
-  divestment of 600 branches in England and Wales (corresponding to 4.6% market of the 
current account market), and behavioural constraints 
-  acquisition ban 
-  dividend ban 
Royal Bank of Scotland 
-  State aid: £15 bn recapitalization and £5 bn preference shares (October 2008), converted into 
ordinary shares in January 2009. Further injection of £25.5 billion in November 2009, giving 
the state a total stake of 84% 
-  internal headcount reduction and restructuring programme 
-  large divestment programme (including RBS Insurance)  
-  divestment of foreign participations (e.g. Bank of China) 
-  sales corresponding to 25-30% of balance sheet 
-  14% ceiling in SME market 
-  acquisition ban; 
-   dividend ban on hybrid capital elements 
Sources: European Commission, DG Comp, state aid register, and company annual reports. 18 | AN OVERVIEW OF STATE AID PROVIDED DURING TH E CRISIS 
 
Germany. In ING’s case, the crisis forced it to rethink its business model, 
reducing complexity and to focus on its core business: banking. KBC had to 
reduce its number of home markets and divest its private banking; Lloyds 
substantially reduced its dominance in the UK market, after the forced 
acquisition of HBoS.  
The degree of balance sheet reduction differs considerably: from less 
than 20% in KBC, to 45% in ING and Commerzbank. The argumentation 
for the large-scale reduction in ING was that the aid amounted to more 
than 2% of risk-weighted assets, but this was also the case for KBC and 
Lloyds, which were less heavily sanctioned. According to the Commission, 
the latter two cases were satisfactory on behavioural constraints, hence the 
balance sheet reduction was lower. 
On several occasions, the Commission mentions that it will use the 
restructuring plans to increase competition in the local retail banking 
markets. The concentration in retail financial markets in the smaller 
member states is a well-known problem, which the Commission’s 
competition policy directorate addressed in a 2007 inquiry (European 
Commission, 2007). Although overall the inquiry concluded that retail 
banking markets in the EU were only moderately concentrated, they were 
highly concentrated in Finland, the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden. 
Increasing competition in the home market is explicitly mentioned in the 
decisions on ING, KBC and Lloyds as reason for requiring certain 
divestments.12 
On the other hand, the European Commission’s state aid unit has 
mandated the divestment of foreign entities of state aided banks, and the 
focus on some core markets, which may reduce competition at EU level. 
This has led to the criticism that it was acting contrary to its own objectives.  
According to ECB and BIS data, market integration has receded since 
the crisis started. Although the situation improved from the second half of 
2009 onwards, market integration indicators are not yet back to the levels 
they were before the crisis erupted (see ECB 2010a). A growing exposure of 
banks to domestic rather than cross-border counterparties is observed (ECB 
2010a, p. 16). The cross-border provision of financial services, in the 
                                                      
12 Explicitly mentioned in the press releases on ING and KBC, European 
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interbank market and corporate securities markets, has declined 
significantly since 2007, although the effect of reduced financial market 
intermediation has to be taken into account (see Figure 3).  
Figure 3. Cross-border provision of financial services in the euro area 
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Source: European Central Bank. 
 
It could be argued that the Commission is measuring competition at 
national level, not at European level. The French refinancing scheme, 
created in October 2008, was cleared the same month by the Commission, 
who judged that the scheme was an appropriate, necessary and 
proportionate means of remedying a serious disturbance in the French 
economy. The Commission authorised it as it gave non-discriminatory 
access for all banks authorised in France, including the subsidiaries of 
foreign groups; it included a pricing mechanism that covered the funding 
costs of the scheme and ensured a fair contribution by the beneficiary 
banks, and it had appropriate safeguards against abuse of the scheme. The 
same happened with the recapitalisation scheme, which was authorised by 
the European Commission on the same grounds. Under the SPPE (Société 
de Prises de Participation de l’Etat) structure, the state invested in securities 
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capital instruments (subordinated debt securities classified as non-core Tier 
1 capital) and were remunerated at a fixed rate for the first five years and at 
a variable rate thereafter. The remuneration, which averaged about 8%, 
reflected the degree of solvency of each beneficiary bank via a credit 
default swap (CDS) component, whereby remuneration is modulated 
according to the risk of default. All large French banks benefited from the 
scheme, but it did not lead to any specific demands on the banks 
involved.13 Only one French bank was the subject of an individual state aid 
procedure, the Banque Populaire/Caisse d’Épargne, which benefited from 
€2.45 billion government aid, on top of that already granted under the 
French scheme. But also that case was cleared by the European 
Commission without further restructuring demands.14 This compares to 13 
individual bank cases in Germany, some of which are still under in-depth 
investigation, and much deeper restructuring demands. 
It should thus come as no surprise that some states felt unjustly 
treated, leading to criticism of arbitrariness and inflexibility in the 
decisions. In January 2010, ING lodged an appeal with the European Court 
of Justice against specific elements of the EC’s Decision of 18 November 
2009. ING objects to the price leadership restrictions and the 
proportionality of the restructuring requirements demanded by the 
European Commission. In addition, the Commission judged that the early 
repayment by ING to the Dutch state of the first tranche of the 
subordinated debt as additional state aid of approximately €2 billion. Both 
ING and the Dutch state contest this element of the Decision.15 The 
Commission argues that early repayment would distort the level playing 
field again. 
Effects of state aid and exit strategies 
Overall, state aid was, in combination with the monetary policy and 
financial market stability measures, successful in preventing a collapse of 
the financial system. The impact on individual banks is, however, less clear 
                                                      
13 See cases 613/2008 (recap) and 548/2008 (refinancing) in the European 
Commission’s state aid register. 
14 Case N249/2009. 
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cut. Different indicators can be used, which point in different directions. In 
general, the share price of most state-aided banks declined, reflecting a 
dilution of shareholders’ earning rights and raising concerns about banks’ 
long-term profitability. In addition, the Commission has set very tight 
criteria for state aid, which negatively impact the future growth plans of 
the banks in question.  
The premia on credit default swaps (CDS) for large banks, on the 
other hand, fell with the announcement of system-wide rescue packages, 
and especially with the announcement of capital injections. Bank CDS 
premia demonstrated a further reduction when the government measures 
were actually implemented. According to research by the BIS (2009), the 
reduction of default risk is correlated with the amount of resources 
pledged, in particular with the size of capital injections.  
Rating agents see a positive effect of the state support schemes on 
bank lending and liquidity, but indicate that they failed to stimulate 
lending. They see a large proportion of the banks currently on their support 
floor, but weakening of the support will result in further downgrades, 
unless the bank has returned to intrinsic health. In addition, refinancing 
needs will remain high until 2012, boosted by the introduction of tighter 
capital requirements (Fitch, 2010). 
Each European government that provided state aid to a financial 
institution affirmed that the measure was temporary, and that the ultimate 
goal should be to return banks completely to the private sector. This, 
however, throws up questions about when and how governments should 
re-privatise financial markets and banks. To answer this question, one must 
assess both the nature of the state aid offered as well as the objectives of the 
governments providing state aid. 
Government guarantees: In principle, government guarantees should be 
self-liquidating. Considering this, the primary question is when 
governments should stop providing banks with guarantees. Should 
governments be allowed to issue guarantees up to the date agreed with the 
Commission, or should governments stop granting state aid before that 
date assuming markets stabilise?  
Recapitalisation and bad banks: As this form of state aid involves an 
actual transfer of government funds in exchange for shares, it must be 
determined when governments should sell shares back to the private 
market, or write them off. To answer this question the following trade-off 
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purchased shares or should it dispose of shares as soon as the market has 
stabilised? (See Annex 4 for examples of European Bad Bank Schemes). 
Nationalisation: Governments can transfer a nationalised bank to the 
private sector in two main ways: through sales in the stock market; or via a 
private placement of bank equity stakes (i.e. either by selling all or part of 
the bank to an existing bank, or selling directly to institutional investors). A 
more important question is whether a government should use its power as 
shareholder to restructure the bank first. Restructuring could involve 
narrowing the bank’s operations, splitting or separating banks and 
insurers, or imposing mergers. 
Formally, however, it should be kept in mind that there is no 
obligation on states to re-privatise, unless this would have been agreed in 
the context of a state aid procedure. The EU Treaty is neutral as regards the 
form of ownership. But the state capital has to be remunerated according to 
market standards. 
Overall assessment of the EU state aid policy during the crisis 
The containment of the financial crisis was the result of a vast 
comprehensive effort by governments, central banks and international 
authorities. Measures to stabilise the financial sector and support the 
economy taken at EU and national levels have benefited all financial 
players and economic actors. But some financial institutions or sectors were 
in need of more substantial support. 
The direct state support happened in a very disparate and non-
coordinated matter, however, in contrast to what the Eurogroup meeting of 
12 October 2008 had affirmed. Many member states chose to call upon a 
national scheme to support the entire financial sector, but the schemes 
varied widely in scale and scope. In other cases, states provided support to 
individual banks, or through a combination of both. In addition, the quality 
of sovereign guarantees differed significantly, thus favouring ‘weak’ 
borrowers with a ‘strong’ sovereign backing, or disadvantaging ‘strong’ 
borrowers with a ‘weak’ sovereign backing.  
Seen in hindsight, comprehensive national support schemes raised 
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the whole banking sector in a certain country.16 The French scheme is a case 
in point, since it was imposed on all the large banks, and rapidly got the 
blessing of the EU, as it was non-discriminatory. In other countries, the 
problem with some banks was much more acute, and required direct state 
support, often in addition to a national scheme. The end-result is that some 
banks ended up in a tight restructuring and downsizing plan imposed by 
the European Commission, whereas others have fared almost unaffected. 
Another result of these differences in national policies is that the banking 
landscape will emerge entirely reshaped after the crisis. 
The question whether the single market was maintained seems 
almost rhetorical in this perspective. Several banks start on a much more 
uneven playing field since the crisis than before it. To some extent, there is 
only the bank and its management to blame. But national policy-makers 
could also be criticised for their limited knowledge of the EU’s state aid 
rules, for their incapacity to put together a comprehensive support plan, 
and for not having reacted rapidly enough. 
                                                      
16 See also Boughdene et al. (2010), who come to the same conclusion in an 
overview regarding asset relief measures in the EU. 24 | 
 
 
II.  THE EVOLUTION OF EU BANK STATE 
AID PRACTICE IN THE CURRENT 
ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRISIS  
Background  
The purpose of this chapter is to provide some legal, institutional and 
procedural background to the cases of state aid in the banking sector. EU 
state aid procedures are far from being well-known to economic actors, 
especially in financial services sector where, historically, EU state aid rules 
have been less frequently applied. 
The fact that more than 60 cases (both schemes and individual bank 
cases) have been dealt with by the European Commission over the last two 
years alone means that this crisis will be a landmark in EU state aid law 
and policy. Whether or not the Commission’s final decisions are contested 
in the European Courts, the Commission’s successive Communications 
(even if these are ‘soft’ rather than ‘hard’ law) taken together with the final 
decisions themselves, will constitute a precedent and a body of practice 
that are likely to endure for many years to come. 
Despite the unprecedented scope and gravity of the current banking 
crisis, it is remarkable that the European Commission has been able to deal 
with the cases referred to it very much as ‘business as usual’, applying – 
broadly speaking – the well-established principles of rescue and 
restructuring aids, adopted for the banking sector. 
One important question raised in this chapter, however, is whether 
this approach was (politically, economically and legally) appropriate (or at 
least  sufficient), given the gravity of the current crisis and its global 
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Two questions in particular arise here. Although the ECOFIN Council 
confirmed in early 2008 that state aid disciplines should be followed as 
regards the recapitalisations, bail-outs and guarantees made available to 
banks by almost all member states, the Commission’s state aid procedures 
not only exclude other EU institutions (e.g. the Council, the Parliament and 
the ECB) from participation in the process, but also the other departments 
of the Commission, such as DG MARKT, DG ECFIN and DGs Trade and 
ReLex.  
Given the interconnection between the ‘aid’ or ‘subsidy’ aspect of the 
banking crisis and the macro-economic, monetary, fiscal and 
regulatory/supervisory dimension (all of which fall outside the exclusive 
competence of the Commission), there appears to be a strong case for 
ensuring that the current Commission state aid procedures are, at some 
stage, reviewed ‘holistically’, with the possibility of adapting individual 
decisions to ensure that the European banking industry as a whole (and the 
embryonic single European financial services market) emerges 
strengthened and more competitive from this crisis. 
Secondly, the state aid procedures will obviously not resolve the 
banking crisis in the EU, taking sufficient account of comparable action (or 
lack thereof) being taken by other jurisdictions, such as the United States. 
Given the global nature of capital markets and the growing importance of 
the G20 and institutions such as the IMF and FSB, it appears vital that the 
EU’s approach is not confined to a case-by-case analysis on the basis of 
wholly internal rules, even if this approach is intended to produce viable 
banks without the need for further aid and a more competitive European 
market place. 
It would be unfortunate, to say the least, if the Commission’s final 
decisions in these cases were to be the subject of prolonged litigation in the 
European Courts. With the exception of the recent cases brought by the 
Netherlands and ING, there are no indications that this is likely to be the 
case. Nonetheless, given the need for stability and legal certainty for banks 
and their customers (as well as financial markets and the economy in 
general), early political and legal ‘closure’ of the current cases (preferably 
by the end of 2010) is in the interests of all. 
The general approach followed in the EU  
Despite the unprecedented severity of the current financial crisis, the 
European Commission – supported by all member states in the Council – 26 | EVOLUTION OF EU BANK STATE AID PRACTICE 
 
has followed a ‘classical’ approach in the cases that it has examined. It has 
applied the provisions of Articles 107-109 TFEU, taking into account 
‘guidelines’ set out in a number of non-binding Commission 
communications, covering general principles, recapitalisation, impaired 
assets and restructuring aids (see below). 
EU state aid law and procedure is, on the whole, less well-known 
than (for example) general EU competition law. In particular, state aid 
procedures contain a number of particular (and controversial) features, 
which require explanation. In particular, despite the emphasis 
(understandably) placed by the Commission on ‘transparency’, state aid 
procedures are in fact far from transparent for those (mainly private sector) 
interests not directly involved in the case being investigated by the 
Commission. Current state aid procedures fall far short of meeting all the 
requirements of ‘due process’. 
These procedural deficits are of particular importance in a situation 
where the Commission has initiated proceedings in over 100 cases, 
involving almost all member states in a little over two years and where a 
decision in one case may have a significant impact on other banks, other 
member state markets and even – for pan-European banks such as ING, 
KBC and Lloyds, for example – the EU market as a whole. Full 
transparency is crucial for comparability and consistency. It is not (yet) 
clear that these principles have been fully respected in the current process.17 
In any event, any discussion of the individual cases considered by the 
Commission in this banking crisis requires a short summary of relevant EU 
state aid law and procedures. 
EU state aid rules applicable to banks 
EU state aid rules are set out in Articles 107-109 TFEU. Procedural rules for 
state aid were consolidated in Regulation 659/1999. As in other fields, such 
as competition policy, the relevant Treaty rules are relatively short and 
simple, leaving ample room for interpretation by the European 
Commission (“administrative discretion”) and by the European Courts. 
                                                      
17 Given the restrictions inherent in the current rules as set out in the Treaty and in 
Regulation 659/1999, it may be impossible to meet these criteria unless the rules 
are amended or a different approach is conceived to take account of the unique 
nature of this banking crisis. BANK STATE AID IN THE FINANCIAL CRISIS | 27 
 
State aid is defined in Article 107(1) in broad terms as being: 
-  granted by a member state or through state resources in any form 
whatsoever; 
-  that distorts or threatens to distort competition; 
-  that favours certain undertakings or the production of certain goods 
(the “selectivity” test); and 
-  that affects trade between member states. 
These ‘elements’ of state aid are cumulative; in the absence of any one 
of them, a measure does not constitute “aid” within the meaning of Article 
107(1). 
Illegal and incompatible aid 
EU law distinguishes between aid that is “illegal” and aid that is 
“incompatible with the internal market”. The former is generally 
considered to be aid that has been implemented by member states without 
having been notified in advance to the Commission in accordance with 
Article 108(3) TFEU.18 The ‘sanction’ for non-notification is an order by the 
Commission for mandatory recovery of non-notified aid, together with 
compound interest from the date of granting the aid. It is an indication of 
member states’ willingness to work constructively with the Commission in 
the current unprecedented crisis, that there are apparently no cases of non-
notified (illegal) aid currently being investigated. At least therefore, the 
additional threat of recovery of illegal aid does not hang over European 
banks, at least on the assumption that the European Commission has now 
been notified of all aid measures. 
Aid that is “incompatible with the internal market” is aid that distorts 
competition and trade. Article 107(2) and (3) lists categories of aid that 
either are to be considered compatible with the internal market (social aid, 
aid to repair natural disasters and aid to compensate for the division of 
Germany)19 and aids that may be considered (by the Commission) to be 
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comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid.” 
19 This paragraph is not relevant to the decisions taken by the Commission on state 
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compatible with the internal market. Two categories of the latter in 
particular are important in the field of banking state aid. These are: 
-  “aid … to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member 
State” (Article 107(3)(b)); and 
-  “aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of 
certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect 
trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest” 
(Article 107(3)(c). 
One crucial development in the current crisis situation has been the 
decision by the Commission, at an early state, to base its consideration of 
compatibility on the (arguably more flexible) criteria in Article 107(3)(b). 
Historically, this provision had rarely been used, mainly because of the 
strict interpretation given to the concept of “serious disturbance in the 
economy of a Member State” by the Commission and by the Court. The 
Commission’s position on the use to be made of Article 107(3)(b) was that it 
cannot be extended to other sectors. 
In practice, given the European Commission’s dominant role in 
interpreting the criteria for compatibility (at least in the absence of 
European Court rulings), - and the fact that the Commission now applies 
comparable rescue and restructuring aid guidelines to banks under Article 
107(3)(b) as it did to industry under Article 107(3)(c) - there may be little 
significant difference between the approach under paragraphs (b) and (c). 
Even under the (allegedly) non-flexible paragraph (b), the Commission 
insists on compliance with the rescue and restructuring guidelines 
(published, for banks, in August 2009), by close analogy with practice 
under the “industrial” rescue and restructuring guidelines, adopted to give 
effect to Article 107(3)(c). 
The Commission’s exclusive role in deciding issues of 
compatibility 
It is important to note that the Commission alone has the authority under 
EU law to decide whether or not national aids may be considered to be 
compatible with the internal market under Article 107(2) or (3).20 
                                                      
20 It is unclear to what extent, at any stage of state aid proceedings, serious 
consultations are held between DG COMP and other Commission services with a 
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Commission decisions on compatibility of incompatibility are subject to 
judicial review by the European Courts under Article 263 TFEU, on the 
application of a member state or – subject to specific conditions – by a 
private party. In contrast, national courts may interpret and apply those 
parts of Articles 107-109 that have direct effect in national law. In essence, 
these are the definition and general prohibition on aid in Article 107(1) and 
the prior notification requirement in Article 108(3) (first sentence). National 
courts are not competent to decide issues of compatibility. 
The relative simplicity of the relevant Treaty rules and the authority 
granted to the European Commission to interpret and enforce these rules 
undoubtedly confers extraordinary responsibility on the Commission, 
especially in the current economic and financial crisis, in terms of 
‘administrative discretion’, particularly on issues of compatibility. It is 
significant that member states in the European Council (and, more 
specifically, in ECOFIN) have consistently confirmed and supported 
Commission action on state aid in the current crisis, notwithstanding the 
political sensitivity and technical complexity of the issues involved. Thus, 
no action has been taken under Article 109 TFEU by the Council (after 
consulting the European Parliament) to exempt particular categories of aid 
(e.g. aids to banks in the current crisis) from state aid procedures.  
Limited judicial review in the European Courts 
The broad administrative discretion enjoyed by the Commission in this 
field is subject to judicial review by the European Courts, notably under 
Article 263 TFEU (“actions for annulment”). However, in addition to the 
procedural limitations imposed by this Article (particularly for actions by 
private parties),21 judicial review is tightly circumscribed, compared with 
                                                                                                                                       
legitimate interest in the restructuring of the European banking industry as a 
whole. 
21 Private parties, such as banks, must demonstrate that actions they may bring 
against the Commission are “admissible” within the meaning of Article 263 (fourth 
paragraph): “any natural or legal person may, under the conditions laid down in 
the first and second paragraphs, institute proceedings against an act addressed to 
that person or which is of direct and individual concern to them, and against a 
regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not entail implementing 
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the situation in many member states (e.g. the UK). The European Courts 
are reluctant to duplicate the economic analysis and assessment made by 
the Commission (for example on compatibility or incompatibility of state 
aid with the internal market), limiting their judicial review to ensuring or to 
checking whether the Commission has made “a manifest error of 
appreciation” in its economic assessments. 
Although there is a certain subjectivity to the concept of “manifest 
error of appreciation”, it is clear that the European Courts will not overturn 
Commission decisions in the banking sector lightly, especially where these 
have involved highly technical assessments, conducted in close cooperation 
with the member state concerned and after having taken into account 
submissions by the private sector in response to Commission notices 
opening the investigation procedure.22 In addition, as is apparent from the 
decisions that have been published on aids to banks, the Commission’s 
practice is now to take comprehensive and tightly-reasoned decisions 
(doubtless assisted by the presence of a Chief Economist’s department in 
D G  C O M P ) ,  w h i c h  a r e  l e s s  l i k e l y  t o  b e  o v e r t u r n e d  o n  a p p e a l  b y  t h e  
European Courts. 
The need for legal certainty for banks, customers, public 
authorities and markets 
Legal certainty is a crucial factor for all concerned with Commission state 
aid procedures. This is particularly the case in the extreme conditions of the 
crisis, which have afflicted governments, the financial sector, the economy 
as a whole and indeed citizens over the last three years. The degree of 
administrative discretion possessed by the Commission (particularly as 
regards the fixing of compatibility criteria and the subsequent assessments 
of compatibility) and the limited scope of judicial review as described 
above do not necessarily facilitate legal certainty. 
Undoubtedly, the successive Communications published by the 
Commission on banking state aid between October 2008 and August 2009 
(covering general principles, recapitalisation, impaired assets and 
restructuring aid) assist all parties concerned in understanding the 
                                                      
22 I t  i s  n o t  o b v i o u s  f r o m  t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  f e w  d e c i s i o n s  t h a t  h a v e  b e e n  p u b l i s h e d  
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Commission’s methodology in the cases it is handling. Although they are 
non-binding (‘soft law’), these Communications constitute an authoritative 
guide (for member states, banks and the European Courts) to the 
Commission’s methodology and would certainly be taken into 
consideration by the European Courts in exercising their judicial review 
function. The broad principles contained in all the Commission’s 
Communications on banking state aid are summarised below. 
More generally however, Commission state aid procedures fall far 
short of affording “due process”, especially as far as private sector interests 
are concerned. In general, state aid cases are conducted between the 
Commission and the member state concerned. In strict legal terms, all state 
aid must be notified in advance of their implementation to the Commission 
in order for it to be able to assess the compatibility of the aid with the 
internal market. If the Commission considers that the proposed aid is, prima 
facie, incompatible with the internal market, then – in accordance with 
Article 108(3) TFEU “it shall without delay initiate the procedure provided 
for in paragraph 2.” No such procedures are prescribed for aids that may 
be considered by the Commission to be compatible with the internal market. 
This does not mean that Commission decisions approving aids may not be 
challenged under Article 263 TFEU, but the fact that the Commission’s 
legal and economic reasons for approving the aid are not published in full 
places a handicap on member states and competitors wishing to challenge 
such decisions. 
When the Commission opens an investigation into a proposed aid 
which it considers, prima facie, to be incompatible with the internal market, 
the Commission publishes a notice inviting third parties to submit their 
comments, in accordance with Article 108(2) (first sentence). Neither the 
Treaty nor the Council Regulation consolidating certain procedural aspects 
of state aid investigations23 provide any legal basis for ‘hearings’ by the 
Commission, either for recipients of aid or their competitors. 
In practice however, the Commission’s services are generally willing 
not only to receive written submissions by interested third parties, but also 
to hold meetings. This tends to be the case with aid recipients in particular, 
but also with competitor enterprises adversely affected by the proposed 
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aid. In the current banking state aid cases, for example, member states have 
frequently been accompanied in their meetings with the Commission by 
representatives of the banks in question. However, it is important to 
underline that this is merely at the discretion of the Commission and the 
member state concerned. 
The usefulness of the ‘rescue and restructuring aid’ formula in the 
present banking cases 
In the cases that it has handled over the last two years or so, the 
Commission has been required to act under severe time constraints. The 
‘price’ that has had to be paid for continuing to deal with all banking state 
aid cases under ‘conventional’ EU state aid law has been for member states’ 
notifications of proposed aid to be vetted by the Commission, sometimes 
within days or over a weekend, in order to preserve – to the maximum 
extent possible – market stability.  
In the vast majority of cases, the Commission ‘approves’ such 
notifications, albeit on a provisional basis, categorising the measure(s) in 
question as a ‘rescue’ aid and requiring the member state to revert to the 
Commission – usually within six months – with a plan for the restructuring 
of the bank, aimed at ensuring its long-term viability without further aid. 
In industrial sectors, the Commission has for many years applied 
specific rules on “rescue and restructuring” aids, based on a methodology 
laid down in a Communication published in the Official Journal.24 Despite 
initial hesitations as to whether the principles applicable in industrial 
sectors could be applied to financial services (especially banking), the 
Commission has (so far successfully) approved notified aids very quickly 
as ‘rescue aids’, with the proviso that the member state concerned submit – 
normally within six months following the rescue aid decision – a 
restructuring plan to the Commission for the bank in question. On the basis 
of this plan – and after discussions with the member state in question25 – 
the Commission could issue a final decision approving the aid in question, 
                                                      
24 OJ C 368 of 23.12.1994, p. 12. 
25 As a matter of practice – though not legal obligation – such consultations usually 
involve the aid recipient, especially if restructuring measures need to be agreed, 
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either with or without conditions attached. The relatively recent 
Commission decisions in cases such as KBC, ING and Lloyds were all taken 
on the basis of this ‘formula’. 
State aid: ‘Business as usual’ despite the gravity of the current 
crisis? 
There is little doubt that the European Commission’s application of the 
state aid rule during the current economic and financial crisis is without 
precedent in the history of the EU.26 The economic and financial 
significance of the amounts of aid involved, the fact that virtually all 
member states are affected (though to different degrees and in diverse 
ways) and the sheer number of individual cases dealt with by the 
Commission, all set this situation apart from others dealt with by the 
Commission over the last 50 years. 
In terms of political sensitivity, financial and economic importance 
and technical complexity, there are many similarities (as far as state aid is 
concerned) between the current banking cases and the approach followed 
over the last 12 years in the field of direct taxation. In both areas, 
notwithstanding the fact that national vital interests at the core of state 
sovereignty have been at stake, member states have decided unanimously 
in the Council actually to encourage the Commission to “take its 
responsibilities under the Treaty” and to apply and enforce relevant rules. 
In both cases, it would have been possible – certainly politically but also 
legally – for the member states in Council to have insisted on action being 
taken exclusively in the Council, for example on the basis of an agreed 
policy framework under legislation adopted on the basis of Article 109 
TFEU.27 
                                                      
26 One possible analogy is the steel crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
However, that sectoral crisis involved a combination of internal EU measures 
(including state aid and a quota-system) and external measures (e.g. dumping 
duties, export understandings and import quotas) covering trade with third 
countries. 
27 Private conversations with Commission officials confirm that the ‘conventional’ 
application of EU state aid rules and disciplines was, by no means, to be taken for 
granted given the gravity of the present crisis. It may be thought extraordinary 
that, notwithstanding the primacy of national economic and political concerns in 
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Instead, both in direct taxation and in the financial services (mainly 
banking) sectors, the Commission has: 
-  acted autonomously in accordance with its ‘classical’ role in the state 
aid field under Articles 107-109 TFEU; 
-  developed its approach pragmatically through non-binding 
Communications, setting out (for the benefit of member states and 
the private sector alike) its intended approach under the fundamental 
Treaty provisions;28 and 
-  made maximum use of the flexibility inherent in the Treaty, 
especially the “derogations” allowed under Article 107(3) (a)-(c); 
successfully avoided – for the most part at least – reaching decisions 
that member states and economic operators feel compelled to refer to 
judicial review in the European Courts. 
At a time of significant political and institutional change (notably 
through the ratification and implementation of the Lisbon Treaty) and 
when fears existed concerning the potential ‘re-nationalisation’ of some 
areas of EU policy, the Commission’s success in preserving its ‘competence’ 
not only to deal administratively with so many cases affecting virtually all 
member states, is remarkable and reflects considerable credit on the first 
Barroso Commission (especially Commissioner Kroes, her Cabinet and 
services). 
The gravity of the current economic and financial crisis is such that, 
in the early stages at least, it was not inconceivable that matters might have 
been taken out of the hands of the European Commission, for example by a 
                                                                                                                                       
f i n a n c i a l  s e c t o r s ,  m e m b e r  s t a t e s  c o n t i n u e  t o  p e r c e i v e  a n  i n t e r e s t  i n  a  f o r m  o f  
independent ‘third party’ rule-based application on such sensitive matters as 
banking and direct taxation.  
28 The publication of detailed interpretative guidelines, in the form of non-binding 
Communications, is of course a well-established Commission practice in the field 
of state aid. Such guidelines fulfil at least three purposes: i) informing donors and 
recipients of aid (as well as competitors) of the approach the Commission intends 
to follow in applying the basic Treaty rules; ii) maintaining, nonetheless, a 
significant measure of flexibility in the detailed application of the guidelines on a 
case-by-case basis; and iii) assisting the European Courts in their judicial review 
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decision of the Council acting under Article 109 TFEU,29 establishing an ad 
hoc procedure for this unprecedented situation. Instead, the Commission 
responded – both on substance and in terms of its internal organisation – in 
a way that appears to have retained (at least in very broad terms) the 
confidence and respect of both member states and private sector alike.  
The Commission’s Communications on state aid in the banking 
sector 
As indicated above, the Commission has provided guidance to member 
states and the private sector by means of a series of Communications of a 
general and specific nature, dealing with issues such as general principles 
of state aid law in the banking sector, recapitalisation, impaired assets and 
restructuring aids. These Communications have been cumulative and 
pragmatic, in the sense that they have provided an evolutionary but 
consistent response to the crisis as it has unravelled. Although these 
Communications are legally non-binding, they do aim to give an 
authoritative indication of the Commission’s approach in this particular 
area.  
The Communications are as follows: 
-  the application of state aid rules to measures taken in relation to 
financial institutions in the context of the current global financial 
crisis (OJ C 270/8 of 25.10.2008); 
-  the recapitalisation of financial institutions in the current financial 
crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards in 
undue distortions of competition (OJ C 10/2 of 15.1.2009); 
-  the treatment of impaired assets in the Community banking sector 
(OJ C 72 of 26.03.2009); and 
-  the return to viability and the assessment of restructuring measures 
in the financial sector (OJ C 195/9 of 19.8.2009). 
It is not appropriate here to attempt to summarise all four 
Communications (see Annex 3). There are however a number of general 
                                                      
29 “The Council, on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the 
European Parliament, may make any appropriate regulations for the application of 
Articles 107 and 108 and may in particular determine the conditions in which 
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themes that characterise the Commission’s approach as a whole. These 
include: 
-  the need to distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ banks, with the 
latter suffering greater restructuring and compensation measures or 
even winding up, compared with banks that have been prudently 
operated; 
-  all aid must be well-targeted, proportionate and minimise negative 
spill-over effects on competitors, other sectors and other member 
states; 
-  aid must be limited to the minimum and the private sector must 
contribute its fair share to restructuring (‘burden-sharing’);30 
-  aid schemes should be limited in time with mandatory periodic 
reviews; 
-  the need to ensure ‘no aid’ to buyers of liquidated financial 
institutions (sales process to be opened and non-discriminatorily, on 
market terms, with a maximum sale price for assets on liability 
involved); 
-  a clear distinction should be made between ‘normal’ liquidity 
provided by central banks in the form of general measures open to all 
comparable market players, compared with support for specific 
financial institutions; 
-  all aid measures and restructuring plans should aim at restoring 
long-term viability, without the need for further injections of aid; and 
-  all EU aid measures and decisions should aim at ensuring a 
competitive European banking sector in a global context. 
                                                      
30 For example, as regards guarantee schemes, beneficiary financial institutions 
should be required to make adequate remuneration “as close as possible to what 
could be considered in market price”, the private sector should cover “at least a 
considerable part of the outstanding liabilities incurred by the beneficiary 
undertaking, with member states’ intervention being limited to amounts exceeding 
the contribution”; if institutions are unable immediately to pay appropriate 
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Transparency, comparability and consistency 
Inevitably, in state aid cases, the Commission is obliged to take a case-by-
case approach as member states notify it of individual aids or aid schemes 
on a case-by-case basis. In the present situation, where the vast majority of 
member states have granted state aid to their banks or other financial 
institutions, it is however crucial, in the interest of preserving a genuine 
Single Market and avoiding fragmentation, that the approach taken by the 
Commission be consistent and that – to the extent possible – the overall 
‘package’ of decisions at least does not ‘freeze’ a situation of market 
fragmentation caused by the fact that, for the most part, the response to the 
present banking crisis has almost exclusively been in the form of national 
measures. It is of course premature to decide whether the Commission’s 
approach is likely to achieve this ambitious goal, since many final decisions 
have yet to be taken. 
In addition, although a ‘case-by-case’ approach is unavoidable, it is 
important that the ‘autonomous’ state aid decisions taken by the 
Commission be consistent with policy decisions taken in other fields, 
including monetary, macro-economic and fiscal policy, as well as 
regulatory and supervisory measures affecting banks (e.g. in the pending 
revisions to the Capital Requirements Directive). Given the way in which 
state aid decisions are taken within the Commission (and in particular the 
relative autonomy of DG COMP), it is not at all clear that the decisions now 
being taken are subject to sufficient coordination with other Commission 
departments or indeed to consideration in the ECOFIN Council. It also 
appears that the ECB and the European Parliament have only played a very 
limited role in the Commission’s ‘management’ of the aids aspects of the 
current crisis. 
Commission decisions in particular cases 
Until a broad cross-section of final decisions has been published by the 
Commission in the Official Journal, a full comparative analysis of the 
Commission’s decisions will be impossible. However, from available 
information (notably concerning the three major decisions taken by the 
Commission so far on KBC, ING and Lloyds), it appears that the 
Commission has followed the principles set out in its Communications, but 
has done so with significant differences of analysis – between the Belgian, 
Dutch and UK cases, for example. Thus, even if the individual decisions 
taken by the Commission are defensible within the Treaty context, it is not 38 | EVOLUTION OF EU BANK STATE AID PRACTICE 
 
obvious that – in taking these decisions – the Commission has taken into 
account the overall structure and competitiveness (both internally and 
externally) of the European banking sector, as should be demonstrated over 
time from the impact of the decisions in question. 
Broadly speaking, in all three cases, substantial amounts of aid have 
been approved subject to onerous ‘offset’ structural and behavioural 
obligations such as divestments, remuneration obligations, bans on 
acquisitions, etc. It is however difficult to compare the structural and 
behavioural elements of the Commission’s decisions in these three cases 
and, perhaps above all, to check the overall effects of the Commission’s 
decisions in these major cases on the EU financial services market as a 
whole. 
One important distinguishing factor in the Lloyds case, for example, 
is the fact that even after completion of the restructuring, the UK 
government will still hold 42.5% of the shares in the Lloyds Banking Group 
(LBG), which is the consequence of the aid granted to the bank in 2009. It 
appears that the Commission decision on Lloyds does not address the issue 
of ‘unwinding’ state support for the bank, even if LBG’s divestment 
obligations are substantial – including branches, staff, customers, customer 
accounts and support infrastructure for, inter alia, the TSB brand, the 
Cheltenham & Gloucester entities, the Lloyds TSB Scotland branches, as 
well as supplementary branches in England and Wales, and the direct bank 
Intelligent Finance. 
Although the discussion between member states and the Commission 
appears to have been largely cooperative and constructive, there are 
indications that – in certain cases at least – certain banks and member states 
may consider that their treatment has been inequitable or even illegal, 
either intrinsically because of incompatibility with EU law or 
comparatively, in relation to the treatment of other banks, including those 
in key member states such as France. 
Perhaps more importantly (as discussed below) member states may 
take the view – in due course when the overall picture of the restructuring 
measures taken on a case-by-case basis by the Commission becomes clear – 
that the Commission has exceeded its powers under the Treaty by 
engaging, in effect, in industrial restructuring, rather than the resolution of 
individual aid cases. As far as ING is concerned, the Commission quite 
openly states that, amongst recent cases, ING has received the highest 
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retail market. However, the Commission states that the divestment package 
agreed with the Dutch authorities is relatively small in its core market but 
compensated by large divestitures in other key business units, such as the 
entire insurance business, ING Direct US, asset management and private 
banking. 
As far as KBC is concerned, the Commission states that total divestitures 
contained in the KBC restructuring plan are less extensive, but are 
compensated by the high price paid by the bank for the aid and the high 
quality of the divestment package. Similarly, for Lloyds, the Commission 
justifies the lower level of divestitures compared with ING by saying that it 
is of high quality and constitutes an attractive business proposition for a new 
entrant on the concentrated UK retail banking market. 
The Netherlands / ING action in the European Courts 
On 28 January 2010, ING launched proceedings against the Commission, 
seeking the partial annulment of the Commission’s Decision of 18 
November 2009 insofar as it qualified the Core Tier 1 capital transaction as 
aid to the amount of €2 billion, and that the Commission subjected the 
approval of the aid to the acceptance of price leadership bans and to 
restructuring requirements going beyond what is proportionate and 
required under the restructuring Communication. In this respect, as 
regards infringements of the principles and guidelines set out in the 
restructuring Communication, ING asserts that the Commission made an 
error of judgement in wrongly calculating the absolute and relative aid 
amounts, requiring excessive restructuring without carefully and 
impartially examining all the relevant facts provided to it, thereby 
deviating from the principles set out in the restructuring Communication. 
On the same date, the Netherlands also instituted proceedings 
against the Commission on the grounds that the Commission’s finding that 
the modifications of the repayment terms in respect of €5 billion of capital 
injection involved state aid. More specifically, the Netherlands authorities 
appear to make an identical submission to that of ING, arguing that the 
Commission’s conclusion that the modification of the repayment terms 
concerning the holding in the core capital of ING constituted €2 billion of 
additional state aid, was erroneous. According to the Dutch Government, 
the Commission should have included the modification of the repayment 
terms in its overall appraisal of the shareholding in the core capital, rather 
than carrying out a separate analysis. In essence, the Dutch authorities 40 | EVOLUTION OF EU BANK STATE AID PRACTICE 
 
appear to argue that the modification of the repayment terms did not 
constitute state aid because it tended to ensure a better reflection of the 
market economy principle in the package as a whole. 
It remains to be seen whether other banks and member states will 
take the same course as the Netherlands and ING and contest the 
Commission’s final decisions before the European Courts.  
Does the Commission’s approach to banking state aid constitute 
industrial policy in disguise? 
Certainly, the restructuring ordered by the Commission in the ING, KBC 
and Lloyds cases is radical by any standards, even if – at least in very broad 
terms – it is based on proposals worked out between the financial 
institutions and the Member States concerned. The Commission itself has 
stated that many if not all divestments have been proposed by the banks 
themselves and that there is at least the assumption that there will be 
sufficient market interest in the divested activities. 
The European Commission’s approach does go further, however. The 
Commission openly admits that its restructuring Communication requires 
an examination of the structure of the market on which the banks operate. 
In the case of KBC, ING and Lloyds, the Commission finds that in each of 
the three domestic markets involved, the top five banks occupy around 
80% of each market. The Commission therefore concludes that: 
the divestments in question will therefore create opportunities for 
new entrants or already present smaller players and will therefore 
remedy any distortions of competition caused by the state aid. 
This seems, at the very least, a bold assumption. Of course, all 
Commission decisions on competition policy in its widest sense (antitrust, 
monopolies, mergers and state aid) to a certain extent ‘shape’ the market in 
question. The present exercise is likely to take this process to 
unprecedented lengths, for example (arguably) by reversing (at least 
partially and for certain financial institutions) the trend to the 
conglomeration of financial services in single institutions.31 I t  i s  a t  l e a s t  
                                                      
31 The Commission has stated that it does not “have a preference for one business 
model over the other. It will assess, on a case by case basis, whether an adjustment 
of the business model of the bank in question is necessary.” It is surely 
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questionable whether such decisions should be taken by an unelected 
Commission acting under Treaty provisions that exclude cooperative action 
within the Council, consultation with a directly-elected Parliament and 
with input from the ECB with its overall responsibility for capital markets 
in the eurozone. 
It has to be kept in mind that these legally binding decisions by the 
Commission are of a completely different character to action being taken in 
other capital markets around the world, notably the United States, Japan, 
and other G20 countries. The Commission asserts (see below) that the 
individual banks and the European banking industry will emerge stronger 
from this process and will therefore be better able to compete on world 
markets. However, this may not be immediately apparent to the ‘victims’ at 
this stage in the process.  
As indicated above, by necessity, the Commission has to conduct 
state aid investigation on an individual, case-by-case basis. On the other 
hand, in the current crisis, a number of member states appear to have been 
more successful than others in presenting schemes or the restructuring of 
their banking sectors as a whole, without singling out individual banks, as 
has been the case for ING and KBC, for example. It is true that the 
Commission has applied the same principles to all banks receiving 
restructuring aid, notably those set out in the restructuring Communication 
of 22 July 2009. Thus, in all cases, the Commission requires that: 
-  The bank will be viable under reasonable stress assumptions without 
further injections of taxpayers’ money in the future; 
-  That the banks contribute a significant proportion of the cost of its 
restructuring via the sale of assets or other means; and 
-  That competition distortions created through the aid are sufficiently 
addressed through relevant reductions of activities. 
                                                                                                                                       
unprecedented for the Commission to take responsibility for dictating the ‘business 
model’ of private enterprise in the EU, even in the name of ensuring fair 
competition. The Commission justifies its approach on two grounds: first the need 
to ensure consequences for past errors (moral hazard) and secondly the need to 
guarantee a “strong presence of the bank”. The Commission asserts that: “in all 
cases the Commission makes sure that the viability of the bank is given priority, so 
that divestment and other behavioural measures limit the competitive distortions 
without endangering long- term viability”. 42 | EVOLUTION OF EU BANK STATE AID PRACTICE 
 
It is not immediately apparent however how the Commission can 
apply point three above without having an overall view of the European 
banking market as it emerges from the crisis and taking into account the 
restructuring measures imposed by the Commission. This immediately 
raises the institutional question of how these state aid decisions are taken 
within the ‘college’ of 27 Commissioners and based on the full 
consideration and consultation between the relevant services.  
In any restructuring of the European banking market to ensure that it 
emerges stronger and more globally competitive from the current crisis, 
one would assume that – at the very least – the commissioners for economic 
and financial affairs on the one hand and the internal market on the other, 
together with their services, would have contributed to these decisions. It is 
not clear that this is the case.32 
In addition, notwithstanding the apparent confidence vested by the 
member states in the Commission in this exercise, it seems strange that 
neither the member states (nor, for example, at least as regards eurozone 
member states and banks, the European Central Bank) have participated in 
this exercise, other than on an individual basis.33 Of course, it may be 
argued that if such an approach had been followed, decision-making 
would have been infinitely complicated. It was more expedient (in addition 
to being consistent with EU law) to ‘delegate’ the task of restructuring the 
European banking industry to the Commission. 
However, such a task goes far beyond the Commission’s ‘mandate’ 
under the Treaty. It is of course arguable that the Treaty is silent on 
industrial restructuring and that the state aid instrument is the only 
mechanism available. This is only partially true, however, as the 
restructuring of the European steel, textiles and shipbuilding industries in 
                                                      
32 The fact that the decisions in the cases of KBC, ING and Lloyds address the issue 
of capital adequacy (at least as regards measures taken by banks that may reduce 
the total amount of their own funds) would appear to indicate the need for close 
consultation on such technical matters with the Commission services responsible 
for the relevant regulatory and supervisory instruments (e.g. the Capital 
Requirements Directive and its proposed modification). 
33 It does not appear from the published Commission papers on these cases that 
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the 1970s and 1980s demonstrates. It would be perfectly possible to 
combine ‘autonomous’ action by the Commission with cooperative 
measures adopted by member states (for example on the basis of EU 
measures adopted under Article 109 TFEU), together with an external 
dimension, if the necessary political will for such a coordinated approach 
existed. It was, after all, the ECOFIN Council in February 200834 that 
originally laid down the principles to be followed (inter alia by the 
Commission) in repairing the damage caused by the crisis, so as to ensure a 
level playing field within the EU and a more competitive financial services 
industry globally. At the same time, ECOFIN laid the groundwork for the 
regulatory and supervisory measures to be taken to prevent this situation 
arising in the future. 
The Commission itself recently organised a high level conference on 
crisis management on 19 March 2010, which agreed on the need for: 
-  strong support for harmonising crisis management tools, based on 
clear threshold conditions and a common assessment of banks’ 
vulnerabilities; 
-  support for a coordination framework between national authorities, 
perhaps – in due course – to cover insolvency regimes for banking 
groups; and 
-  basing future resolution systems on the ‘polluter pays’ principle. 
Many of the objectives of the new crisis management framework are 
identical to those in the state aid field. These include minimising overall 
costs and protecting public funds, avoiding competitive distortions and 
ensuring a level playing field in the internal market. The framework is to 
apply to individual institutions whether or not they are systemically 
important. The Commission’s paper recognises that financial support may 
be one solution in appropriate circumstances, that moral hazard should be 
avoided and that such financial support should comply with state aid rules.  
Whilst it is appreciated that the Commission’s actions on state aid 
were and are essential to deal with the current threatened collapse of the 
banking system, and the proposed crisis management system is intended to 
prevent such a situation ever arising again, logic would appear to suggest a 
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need for the EU (institutions and member states) to take an holistic view 
combining ‘both sides of the coin’.  
In theory, assuming that all the Commission’s decisions on 
restructuring aid could be taken in 2010, it would be possible for an 
overview to be taken of the internal market for banking and related 
services that would emerge when considering the entirety of the 
Commission’s decisions. The Commission itself might prepare a paper for 
the European Council (via ECOFIN), in which it would draw appropriate 
conclusions from the restructuring ‘package’ seen as a whole. 
There are of course immediate objections to such a far-reaching idea. 
First, the Commission might well maintain that – under the Treaty - its 
state aid decisions are subject to review only by the European Courts. The 
Commission traditionally maintains that, when it has decided that a state 
aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU exists, then the Commission 
has no discretion other than to take a decision that either holds that an aid 
is incompatible with the internal market and must be abolished or may be 
deemed compatible under certain conditions. It would be difficult for the 
Commission to deny, however, that there is no element of discretion or 
economic appreciation in its ‘designing’ the form and content of national 
restructuring measures (including ‘compensation’ measures to remedy 
distortions of competition). There is therefore no obvious reason why the 
restructuring process as a whole could not be reviewed and, if necessary, 
adjusted, provided this was done within a reasonable timeframe. 
There is also the problem of judicial review. Most cases take a 
minimum of three to five years to be resolved, unless an accelerated 
procedure is used. It is not entirely clear that litigation under these 
conditions provides a solution for the litigants, shareholders or markets, 
certainly not in the short term. If we assume that the Commission’s 
decision will be annulled by the Court in a few years time, the Commission 
would be required to recommence its examination of the case. Experience 
shows that such a re-examination can add on months or years to this 
process.  
There is no doubt that more comprehensive consultations embracing 
all the aspects of the current crisis (legal, regulatory, supervisory, macro-
economic, monetary, fiscal, international etc.) pose political and practical 
problems, particularly in a European Union of 27 member states and with 
an institutional structure which is in any event complex, but exacerbated by 
the division between the eurozone and non-eurozone member states. BANK STATE AID IN THE FINANCIAL CRISIS | 45 
 
Of course, if (unlike the Netherlands government and ING) member 
states and banks are content to accept the individual Commission decisions 
in ‘their’ cases (possibly because the state aid procedure has been able to 
produce agreement between the Commission, member state and bank(s) 
concerned on the scope of restructuring measures), then the need for 
modifications or adaptations to be made ex post is less apparent. 
Nonetheless, given the scale of the restructuring exercise currently 
underway, and the intrinsic relationship between the European banking 
industry, there does at least seem to be a strong case in favour of a more 
‘joined up’ approach than is currently being followed within the EU. 46 | 
 
 
III. STATE AID IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 
he financial crisis has brought to the forefront two truths about the 
international banking system. First, large banks are international 
organisations, meaning that they conduct a substantial amount of 
their business outside their home country. Second, these banks are 
extremely interconnected due to extensive OTC securities and derivatives 
trading as well as through interbank money lending.  
While banks are increasingly global in nature, legislation is still 
largely domestic – or at best regional in the case of the EU. The implications 
of this absence of global legislation are significant as state aid policy in one 
country could have distorting effects on competition in another. For 
example, if a bank has access to state aid from its home government, this 
could give this bank a competitive advantage also in host countries. 
Furthermore, there are incidences whereby foreign-owned banks have been 
excluded from state aid provided to domestic banks. An example is seen 
with countries that make state aid eligible only to banks having their 
corporate headquarters in the country.  
At the global level, three fora exist for ‘regulating’ the financial 
services industry: the G20, international organisations as monitoring 
authorities, and, most importantly, the WTO.  
The G20 
As a result of the crisis, the G-20 has emerged as the forum to discuss 
international economic and financial sector governance, rapidly pushing 
the G-7 aside. The London and Pittsburgh G-20 meetings issued strong and 
detailed declarations of intent. The G-20 instituted a new structure for 
global coordination in financial regulation and supervision, and called for a 
coordination of exit strategies, but stops short of any direct references to 
state aid and possible competitive distortions from a global perspective.  
T BANK STATE AID IN THE FINANCIAL CRISIS | 47 
 
Within the G-20 context, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) has 
played a significant role in advising on coordination of crisis management. 
In the “Principles for Cross-border Cooperation on Crisis Management” 
members have agreed that during a crisis, authorities will: 
Strive to find internationally coordinated solutions that take 
account of the impact of the crisis on the financial systems and real 
economies of other countries, drawing on information, 
arrangements and plans developed ex-ante. These coordinated 
solutions will most likely be mainly driven by groups of 
authorities of the most directly involved countries.35 
Attempts at the G-20 to achieve this i n  p r a c t i c e  w e r e  s e e n  a t  t h e  
November 2009 G-20 finance ministers meeting where members agreed to 
exchange notes on their exit plans for bank state aid introduced since 2007, 
so as to avoid surprises and facilitate coordination where possible and 
needed.36 At that meeting it was agreed by members that any removal of 
emergency measures requires a considerable amount of judgment and 
flexibility with respect to timing and sequencing, and that the withdrawal 
of support measures may also have lateral effects on other countries. 
Considering this, gains should be achieved from advance information 
exchange and from stronger forms of co-ordination where such side effects 
are potentially significant.37  
Specifically, it was agreed that four general principles should guide 
the exit strategies. First, the goal of any exit strategy should be to enhance 
stability. In practice, this means that policies should err on the side of 
caution and remain in place in the short term as a means to reassure the 
market, even if they go unused. Second, pricing and other conditions of 
support measures should support a market-based exit, meaning that the 
                                                      
35 Financial Stability Board, “FSF Principles for Cross-border Cooperation on Crisis 
Management”, 2 April 2009 
(http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904c.pdf). 
36 Financial Stability Board, “Exit from extraordinary financial sector support 
measures”, Note for G20 Ministers and Governors meeting, 6-7 November 2009, p. 
1 (http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_091107b.pdf).  
37 Financial Stability Board, “Exit from extraordinary financial sector support 
measures”, Note for G20 Ministers and Governors meeting, 6-7 November 2009, 
pp. 1-2 (http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_091107b.pdf).  48 | STATE AID IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 
 
incentives of market participants should lead them to draw less on support 
measures as markets normalise. In this case, as differing pricing among 
countries can have a clearly distorting effect, coordinating pricing strategies 
among countries is one area where cooperation is seen to be important. 
Third, members should take into account cross border effects when 
formulating and implementing exit strategies. Last, the timing of exits 
should be as early as possible, but reflect the need for economic stability; and 
announcements for exits must take into account impacts on market 
confidence at certain times.38  
In addition to the note, the FSB requested that the International 
Association of Deposit Insurers (IADI) and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) report on strategies to unwind temporary depositor protection 
in the wake of the crisis. The results showed that many of the enhanced 
deposit schemes differed in time and scope and in order to avoid 
distortions, cooperation was needed during exits.  
The work done by the G-20 FSB represents a concerted effort to 
coordinate crisis management among members. It should be recognised, 
however, that the note only refers to exit strategies, and not to the state aid 
packages themselves. Because of this, it is not within the mandate of the 
FSB to ensure that individual state aid packages do not contradict free 
competition. In addition, the G-20 note does not cover emergency fiscal or 
monetary policies. As a lack of coordination in these areas could have 
distorting effects in practice, the FSB represents only one of the actors in the 
overall policy coordination.  
International organisations 
Several other international organisations play a role in monitoring and 
making proposals for international financial sector governance. A new 
initiative is Global Standard, which was launched by the Italian G8 
presidency in 2009, to develop a set of common principles and standards 
for propriety, integrity and transparency in international business and 
finance. The following organisations are in the working group: 
                                                      
38 For a more detailed summary see text of the note: Financial Stability Board, “Exit 
from extraordinary financial sector support measures”, Note for G20 Ministers and 
Governors meeting, 6-7 November 2009 
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International Labour Organisation (ILO), the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the World Bank, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the 
OECD (as the coordinator). The group has been vocal in calling on 
governments to resist protectionism, and improve international regulation 
of financial markets.  
The Global Standard calls for convergence on a wide range of topics 
including corporate governance, market integrity, financial regulation and 
supervision, tax cooperation, and transparency of macroeconomic policy 
and data. The group has addressed many aspects of competition policy and 
the effects of current policies on public debt. As with many international 
organisations, compliance and enforcement is often an issue as 
implementation is left to individual states. Given its recent start, it is too 
early to make an assessment of this initiative. 
The WTO 
By far the most developed forum for multilateral liberalisation of trade in 
financial services is the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS). Pursuant to Article I:2, the GATS covers the following forms of 
trade in services: Cross-border supply, Consumption abroad; Commercial 
presence; and Movement of natural persons. With respect to state aid to the 
banking industry, the most important concern is the establishment of 
commercial presence whereby the service is provided within a country by a 
locally-established affiliate, a subsidiary, or by a representative office of a 
foreign-owned and foreign-controlled company. In the absence of a 
commercial presence (for example if an online bank were to offer services 
in a host country, but not maintain a physical presence in that country) 
governments are not required to adhere to the obligation to provide 
national treatment when they provide financial aid to banks. If this were 
the case, they would be required to provide aid extraterritorially.  
Specifically, two articles within the GATS are relevant when 
considering situations where state aid may have distorting effects on 
competition. First, GATS Article XV (Subsidies) recognises that any 
subsidies offered might have “trade distortive effects”. However, Article 
XV GATS does not impose obligations with regard to subsidies that are 
granted by WTO members in relation to services or service suppliers. It only 
indicates that members “shall enter into negotiations” to develop 
disciplines to avoid trade-distortive effects of subsidies. This is a matter 
dealt with in the Doha Negotiations, but negotiations have until now not 50 | STATE AID IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 
 
resulted in anything substantial. In the case that a member considers that it 
is adversely affected by a subsidy of another member, it may request 
consultations on such matters. According to the article, “such requests shall 
be accorded sympathetic consideration”.  
Second, and at present more importantly, GATS Article XVII:1 
(National Treatment) states that a  
Member shall accord to services and service suppliers of any 
other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply 
of services, treatment no less favourable than that it accords to 
its own like services and service suppliers.  
This equal treatment may be achieved either by offering identical 
treatment, or formally different treatment that accords the same benefits 
and does not result in any distorting effects. It is important to stress that 
this obligation only applies to the extent the WTO member in question has 
made a national treatment commitment in the sector at stake (here: 
financial services) and has not inscribed a limitation to its commitment (e.g. 
for state aid). 
It should be noted that the national treatment obligation only applies 
to measures that affect the competitive environment in the member state 
taking the measures. This is significant as government guarantees offered 
to a bank in one country could heighten the perceived stability of that bank 
abroad, and thus give it a competitive advantage over other banks 
operating in its foreign markets. Under the current GATS framework, there 
is no recourse in this situation.39 
Preliminary conclusions from GATS XVII:1 are that members must 
accord national treatment to all financial service providers with a 
commercial presence in their country to the extent that any treatment could 
have anticompetitive effects within that country. Thus, one could assume 
that banks receiving state aid by a member state of the EU must also extend 
that aid to foreign (i.e. non-EU) banks with a commercial presence in the 
member state. Currently, this is not the case in certain member states of the 
                                                      
39 See Bart De Meester (2010), “The Global Financial Crisis and Government 
Support for Banks: What Role for the GATS?”, Journal of International Economic Law, 
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EU as state aid is often contingent on the organisation being incorporated 
in the country, and of systemic importance.  
The National Treatment provision under GATS is complicated by the 
WTO’s “Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services”. The 
Understanding applies when a member has indicated in its schedules of 
commitments that it makes commitments on the basis of the 
Understanding. The Understanding contains a number of 'model 
commitments', providing some harmonised commitments for liberalisation 
of trade in financial services that go further than what members might 
otherwise have done. In Part C of the Understanding (National Treatment) 
it is stated that:  
Under terms and conditions that accord national treatment, each 
Member shall grant to financial service suppliers of any other 
Member established in its territory access to payment and clearing 
systems operated by public entities, and to official funding and 
refinancing facilities available in the normal course of ordinary 
business. This paragraph is not intended to confer access to the 
Member's lender of last resort facilities.  
The paragraph in the Understanding clearly excludes lender of last 
resort facilities from the scope of the obligation to provide National 
Treatment. Government assistance that are not lender of last resort facilities 
may be considered “official funding and refinancing facilities”, to which 
the national treatment obligation set out in this paragraph would normally 
apply. The financial crisis can hardly be considered a “normal course of 
ordinary business” circumstance. Still, one could argue that the national 
treatment obligation in Article XVII GATS would continue to apply for 
other types of 'emergency aid', such as the support schemes discussed 
above. Hence, WTO Members must not limit the aid to domestic banks and 
exclude foreign-owned banks with a commercial presence from this benefit. 
This is of course subject to the precondition that the member in question 
has made a National Treatment commitment without relevant limitation. 
To date there have been no cases brought to the WTO regarding the 
anti-competitive effects of state aid to banks. This could be a function of 
many things such as the lack of clarity of the law, or the ubiquity with 
which states have provided aid to the financial sector. One major legal 
reason is perhaps the existence of an exception for measures that violate an 
obligation in the GATS but are “taken for prudential reasons”, as provided 
for in Paragraph 2 (a) of the GATS Annex on Financial Services. As an 52 | STATE AID IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 
 
example of such measures, the paragraph mentions measures taken “to 
ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system”. This provision 
may not be used to avoid a country’s obligations and commitments under 
the GATS agreement on national treatment or market access.40 Considering 
this, one may assume that countries feel that current state aid does fall 
within the scope of the prudential carve-out, and that it is not intended to 
be trade restrictive.  
Whatever the reason, the lack of use of the WTO in regulating anti- 
competitive practices related to state aid suggests that many improvements 
could be made in the way competition in the market for financial services is 
regulated at the global level. The financial crisis confirmed the impression 
of the minimal relevance of the current multilateral framework regulating 
trade in services. The post-crisis period therefore offers a unique 
opportunity to clarify the scope of GATS law as related to financial services 
to establish with greater precision the remit of the prudential carve-out. If 
not, the construct will remain more of a theoretical nature.41 
                                                      
40 Sydney J. Key (2003), The Doha Round and Financial Services Negotiations, AEI 
Press, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., p. 25. 
41 Pierre Sauvé and Panagiotis Delimatsis (2010), Financial Services Trade after the 
Crisis: Policy and Legal Conjunctures, TILEC Discussion Paper, Tilburg Law and 
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OUTLOOK 
he EU gave a strong impression of being unprepared when the 
financial crisis hit. It had been calling for a single market for financial 
services for some 20 years, but when the crisis hit, no contingency 
plans were in place for organising bank rescues in an orderly way at the 
European level. In the meantime, efforts are being taken on several fronts to 
draw lessons from the crisis. Work is well advanced to create a new EU 
supervisory architecture: a European Systemic Risk Board and a Banking 
Authority are in the making, the latter of which will have the powers to 
take individual decisions in emergency situations. The European 
Commission has also embarked upon a far-ranging discussion on bank 
crisis management and resolution procedures. In this regard, specific 
proposals have been made by third parties for the creation of new entities 
designed to intervene in crisis situations and to bail out banks, namely a 
European Deposit Guarantee Fund (Carmassi et al., 2010), a Financial 
Sector Stabilisation Fund (Speyer, 2010) and a European Resolution 
Authority (Strauss-Kahn and IMF, 2010).  
What seems to have been overlooked in all these proposals for a new 
resolution framework is the integration of the EU’s state aid policy rules. 
Should the financial sector be exempted from the application of EU state 
aid policy, as some have argued? Will an eventual European framework for 
bank resolution not create an even larger moral hazard? This Task Force 
report concludes that any proposed resolution authority must integrate, 
clearly specify and reflect the EU’s state aid policy objectives of 
proportionality, necessity and focus.  
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ANNEX 1. FORM OF INTERVENTIONS BY EU 
STATES IN SUPPORT OF FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS, SEPT. 2007- OCT. 2010 
Member 
state 
Guarantee 
schemes 
Recapitalisation 
schemes 
Schemes 
combining 
several 
measures 
Other 
measures 
Affected 
financial 
institutions * 
 
Austria    x    3 
Belgium         5 
Bulgaria          
Cyprus  x        
Czech Rep.          
Denmark  x x      2 
Estonia          
Finland  x x      1 
France  x x      1 
Germany    x    13 
Greece    x     
Hungary    x     
Ireland  x x      4 
Italy  x x       
Latvia  x       2 
Lithuania    x     
Luxembourg         1 
Malta          
Netherlands  x       4 
Poland  x x       
Portugal  x x      1 
Romania          
Slovakia  x x       
Slovenia  x x       
Spain  x x    x  1 
Sweden  x x      1 
UK  x   x    5 
EU total         44 
* This number counts cases during the financial crisis concerning one and the same bank only once. 
Source: Compiled from European Commission, DG Comp, updated until August 2010. 57 | 
ANNEX 2. TIMELINE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF GUARANTEE AND 
RECAPITALISATION MEASURES 
Table 1. Guarantee schemes approved by the Commission since October 2008 
2008  2009  2010 
   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
France                                                                                                             
Italy                                                                                                             
United Kingdom                                                                                                              
Sweden                                                                                                             
Cyprus                                                                                                             
Ireland                                                                                                             
Germany                                                                                                             
Netherlands                                                                                                             
Portugal                                                                                                             
Denmark                                                                                                             
Finland                                                                                                             
Greece                                                                                                             
Austria                                                                                                             
Slovenia                                                                                                             
Latvia                                                                                                             
Spain                                                                                                             
Hungary                                                                                                             
Poland                                                                                                             
Slovakia                                                                                                             
Lithuania                                                                                                             
                                                58 | ANNEXES 
 
                                                
Table 2. Recapitalisation schemes approved by the Commission since October 2008 
2008  2009  2010 
   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
France                                                                                                             
Italy                                                                                                             
Denmark                                                                                                             
United Kingdom                                                                                                             
Szwden                                                                                                             
Germany                                                                                                             
Greece                                                                                                             
Austria                                                                                                             
Hungary                                                                                                             
Portugal                                                                                                             
Slovakia                                                                                                             
Poland                                                                                                             
Spain                                                                                                             
Finland                                                                                                             
Lithuania                                                                                                             
Source: EU Commission, DG COMP.                                     59 | 
ANNEX 3. SUMMARY OF EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION POSITIONS ON STATE AID 
IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR 
The “Banking Communication” of 13 October 2008 
The application of State aid rules in relation to financial institutions in 
the context of the current financial crisis, 2008/C270/02 of 25 October 2008 
 
The Commission stresses in this document that any support measure taken 
should be exceptional, and that the situation in the financial sector should 
be reviewed every six months. These measures could otherwise “generate 
harmful moral hazard”.42 The European Commission specified several 
conditions that must be met in national support schemes: 
•  Non-discriminatory access, eligibility for support should not be based 
on nationality;  
•  State commitments must be limited in time and scope, while 
excluding unjustified benefits for shareholders;  
•  Adequate remuneration of the state financial support (in guarantee or 
debt schemes), recapitalisation must be limited to the minimum 
necessary and followed by a restructuring plan;  
•  Private sector contribution;  
•  Behavioural rules for beneficiaries that prevent an abuse of state 
support, such as expansion and aggressive market strategies on the 
back of a state guarantee;  
•  State aid should be followed by structural adjustment measures; and 
•  Winding-up procedures should be open and take place on market 
terms.  
The Communication adds that observance of these principles, 
including in individual aid measures, is the responsibility of the member 
states, subject to monitoring by the Commission. 
                                                      
42 European Commission (2008b, p. 10). 60 | ANNEXES 
 
The “Recapitalisation Communication” of 5 December 2008 
The recapitalisation of financial institutions in the current financial 
crisis: limitations of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards 
against undue distortions of competition, C(2008)8259 of 5 December 
2008 
The difficulties national state aid schemes pose to free competition led the 
European Commission to publish a further Communication in December 
2008 on the principles governing state recapitalisation of financial 
institutions. State capital injections need to be remunerated close to market 
prices to avoid distortions of competition at EU level, but they need also to 
take into account the different circumstances of the banks and financial 
markets in question. Lack of differentiation may also weaken the overall 
competitiveness of European banks. The Commission Communication 
therefore proposes some pricing mechanisms for state recapitalisations and 
a price corridor determined by: 
i)  the required rate of return on subordinated debt representing a lower 
bound (being 7%) and  
ii)  the required rate of return on ordinary shares representing an upper 
bound (being 9.3%).  
The Communication complements this guidance to include 
conditions other than remuneration rates and deals with the terms under 
which distressed, less-performing banks may have access to public capital. 
 
The “Impaired Assets Communication” of 25 February 2009 
The treatment of impaired assets in the Community banking sector, 
2009/C 72/0 of 25.02.2009 
This Communication gives guidance on how member states can create state 
aid schemes for impaired assets in conformity with EU rules and sets the 
rules these schemes must fulfil to gain state aid approval. The 
Communication covers both the purchase of impaired assets by the state 
(bad bank schemes) as well as insurance solutions, guarantees and the 
nationalisation of banks. The exact form of the relief measures remains the 
responsibility of each member state, but they will be assessed by the EU 
from a state aid perspective. The Commission discusses the following 
principles: 
-  development of eligible categories of assets (“baskets”)  BANK STATE AID IN THE FINANCIAL CRISIS | 61 
 
-  coordinated approach to valuation and pricing of assets eligible for 
relief; the valuation of impaired assets should be based on a uniform 
methodology established at Community level, and validated by the 
European Commission; 
-  further definition of the state aid rules and relief award procedure; 
full transparency and disclosure of impairments, with adequate 
burden-sharing of the costs related to impaired asset between the 
shareholders, the creditors and the State, and adequate remuneration 
for the State;  
-  time limitation of the relief programme and incentives to participate; 
imposition of behavioural constraints.  
 
The “restructuring communication” of 19 August 2009 
The return to viability and the assessment of restructuring measures in 
the financial sector in the current crisis under state aid rules, 2009/C 
195/04 of 19.08.2009 
This communication deals with the restructuring plan member states need 
to submit for banks that benefit from state aid. The plan should 
demonstrate how the bank will restore long-term viability with state 
support, including a comparison with alternative options, such as break-up 
or merger with another entity. Restructuring plans should not last more 
than five years. State support should be limited to the minimum necessary 
and be mirrored by equity holders. State aid should not be used for the 
acquisition of competing business, a condition that applies for at least three 
years and may continue until the end of the restructuring period. The 
Communication applies until end-2010. 62 | 
 
ANNEX 4. SUMMARY OF BAD BANK SCHEMES 
1. The Irish Impaired Assets Scheme43 
On 10 September 2009, the Irish government published the National Asset 
Management Agency (NAMA) Bill. NAMA is a statutory body corporate, 
with its proper board of directors appointed by the minister. The agency 
has extensive powers to acquire and manage debt facilities and the 
underlying property and property-related assets upon which such facilities 
are secured. Accordingly, NAMA’s purposes, as outlined by the 
government, are the following: 
i)  the acquisition by that Agency of certain assets from certain persons 
to be designated by the Minister for Finance; 
ii)  effecting the expeditious and efficient transfer of those assets to that 
Agency; 
iii)  the holding, managing and realizing of those assets by that Agency 
(including the collection of interest and capital due, the taking or 
taking over of collateral where necessary and the provision of funds 
where appropriate); 
iv)  the taking by that Agency of all steps necessary or expedient to 
protect, enhance and better realize the value of assets transferred to it; 
v)  the performance by that Agency of such other functions, related to 
the management or realization of those assets, as provided in this Act 
or as directed by the Minister; 
vi)  the facilitation of restructuring of credit institutions of systemic 
importance to the economy, and to provide for the valuation of the 
assets concerned and the review of any such valuation, to give the 
National Asset Management Agency certain powers and other 
functions in respect of land or an interest in land acquired by that 
Agency, including powers relating to the development of land, to 
provide for the issuing of debt securities by the Minister for Finance 
                                                      
43 See Boughdene, Yassine et al. (2010) for a more comprehensive overview and 
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and by that Agency in the performance of its functions under this 
Act.44  
Under the scheme, banks can apply to participate in NAMA within 
28 days of the commencement of the legislation, a date to be determined by 
the Finance Ministry. The Ministry will approve banks based on their 
systemic importance to the financial system as well as the extent to which 
they are eligible for support by a foreign government or parent company.  
The valuation of assets to be purchased by NAMA is perhaps the 
bill’s most controversial aspect. According to the bill bank assets will be 
priced at their long-term economic value. Part 5, Article 70 of the Bill, 
“Valuation Methodology” contends that long term economic value is 
defined as the following: 
i)  a reference to the long-term economic value of a property is a 
reference to the value, as determined by NAMA in accordance with 
this Part, that it can reasonably be expected to attain in a stable 
financial system when the crisis conditions prevailing at the passing 
of this Act are ameliorated and in which a future price or yield of the 
property is consistent with reasonable expectations having regard to 
the long-term historical average, and  
ii)  a reference to the long-term economic value of a bank asset is a 
reference to the value, as determined by NAMA in accordance with 
this Part, that it can reasonably be expected to attain in a stable 
financial system when the crisis conditions prevailing at the passing 
of this Act are ameliorated45 
The bill states that NAMA will consider all of the following when 
determining the long-term economic value of assets it purchases: 
-  the market value of the property; 
-  the market value of the bank asset; 
-  the long-term economic value of the property;  
                                                      
44  National Asset Management Agency Bill, 2009: 
http://www.oireachtas.ie/viewdoc.asp?DocID=12724 
45  National Asset Management Agency Bill, 2009: 
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-  the long-term economic value already determined by NAMA, in 
accordance with the valuation methodology, of any other similar 
property or bank asset; 
-  credit-worthiness of debtors 
-  performance history of debtors 
Compliance with Commission state aid rules 
It is likely that using long-term valuation will result in NAMA valuing and 
purchasing assets above their present market value. This is highlighted by 
the ministry stating it will exercise wide discretion and consider all factors 
when determining the value of assets it purchases. If assets purchased by 
NAMA are valued at prices above current market rates, this may not 
necessarily contradict Commission state aid policy as long as the conditions 
in the Commission Communication, noted above, are met, namely, all 
purchases safeguard financial stability and underpin bank lending; 
purchases do not affect budget sustainability or debt requirements; 
purchases follow a Community approach. If purchases go beyond these 
principles, this will likely be considered illegal state aid. 
Another cause for concern may be the way NAMA applies its ability 
to consider the access foreign banks operating in Ireland have to state aid 
from their home country or liquidity from a parent company. If this 
discretion is done within the context of the Community approach, and thus 
seeks to ensure burden sharing and cooperation with other national 
authorities, actions will comply with EU state aid legislation. If, however, 
NAMA is seen to discriminate against foreign banks operating in Ireland 
by not providing asset relief (that would otherwise improve financial 
stability and enhance lending) this could go against EU state aid law that 
requires governments to act in a non-discriminatory way when granting 
state aid.  
Commission approval  
The asset relief scheme was approved on 26 February 2010. The mechanism 
is said to meet the Commission’s Communication on the treatment of 
impaired assets. Specifically, the scheme was non-discriminatory as it is 
open to all systemically important credit institutions established in Ireland, 
including subsidiaries of foreign banks. The scheme is also limited in time 
as it had a 60-day application window that expired on 19 February 2010. BANK STATE AID IN THE FINANCIAL CRISIS | 65 
 
Five institutions participate: Anglo Irish Bank, Allied Irish Bank, Bank of 
Ireland, Irish Nationwide Building Society and Educational Building 
Society. 
NAMA is said to meet Commission requirements regarding 
disclosure, transparency, and the alignment of banks' incentives with 
public policy objectives. The scheme includes an adequate burden-sharing 
mechanism through the payment of a transfer price that is no greater than 
the assets’ long-term economic value, and the inclusion of an adequate 
remuneration for the state in the rate used to discount the assets’ long-term 
economic cash flows. 
The Irish authorities anticipated that NAMA would purchase land 
and development loans as well as associated commercial loans with a 
nominal value of approximately €80 billion for an estimated purchase price 
of €54 billion. 
The approval is only for the scheme. The Commission will assess the 
compatibility (and, in particular, the actual transfer price) of the transferred 
assets when they are separately notified by the Irish authorities.46 These 
individual reviews will include a claw-back mechanism in case of excess 
payments.47 
References 
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Client Update: National Asset Management Agency Bill 2009, Matheson, 
Ormsby Prentice 
DG Competition Website, 26.2.10: 
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2. German Impaired Asset Scheme 
On 23 July 2009, the German “Bad Bank Act” (Gesetz zur Fortentwicklung 
der Finanzmarktstabilisierung) came into force. Specifically, the act sets out 
three distinct models for asset relief: a special purpose vehicle (SPV), a 
federal law resolution agencies model, and a state law resolution agencies 
model.  
The special purpose vehicle 
The SPV allows banks to remove risk positions, in particular “structured 
securities”, off their balance sheets. The term “structured securities” is 
defined in vague terms in the Act. According to the explanatory 
memorandum it includes “bonds created in the course of complex 
securitization transactions or securities issued in the course of 
securitization transactions of a portfolio of various types of assets”. 
Examples of structured securities include asset-backed securities, 
collateralised debt and loan obligations, and mortgage-backed securities 
(residential and commercial). Only ‘structured securities’ purchased on or 
before 31 December 2008 are eligible for removal. 
Institutions seeking asset relief are required to fulfil certain eligibility 
requirements. Contrary to other financial stabilisation measures taken by 
the German government, eligibility for asset relief via the SPV is more 
limited. Only credit institutions or financial holding companies with a 
domestic seat or a domestic or foreign subsidiary of such a company are 
eligible. This means that insurance companies, pension funds and 
investment companies are not eligible transferring entities.48  
There are also limitations on transfer value. According to the act, 
structured securities transferred to the SPV must be ‘sold’ at whichever is 
the highest value: 
1)  90% of the book value as of June 30 2008 
2)  90% of the book value as of March 31 2009 
3)  The actual economic value 
                                                      
48 Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer Briefing “German Bad Bank Act in Force”, 
(August 2009), p. 2. BANK STATE AID IN THE FINANCIAL CRISIS | 67 
 
It should be noted that the 10% reduction in asset price reflects EU 
Commission guidelines, but that this reduction will only be made if the 
transferring entity can maintain a core capital ratio of 7%.49  
In exchange for the toxic assets, banks receive debt securities from the 
SPV. These guarantees are backed by the government, thus removing 
valuation risks. As the debt securities are backed by the Federal 
government they can be used to raise liquidity. Any losses incurred on 
assets are only indirectly born by the transferring entity and are limited to 
any dividends that may be paid out of the annual profit of the entity.  
The federal law resolution agencies model 
Under the federal resolution model the role of the bad bank is assumed by 
agencies created within the Federal Market Stabilization Authority (FMSA). 
As such, any risks are more closely connected to the Federal government. 
In addition, risks may be greater as the scope and volume of assets that can 
be transferred is larger than under the SPV. Transferring entities may sell 
‘structured securities’ as well as ‘risk positions’. Risk positions comprise 
receivables, securities (including government bonds), derivative financial 
instruments, and rights and obligations from loan commitments or 
guarantees. This expanded list is meant to allow banks to greatly reduce 
their balance sheet and streamline operations (which may be used in the 
event that the EU imposes restructuring requirements).50  
In addition, transferring companies may include SPVs. To 
compensate for the higher risk, transferring entities must directly 
compensate for any losses incurred on assets bought by the agency (i.e. the 
principle of owner responsibility). The German government expects that 
the value of assets to be transferred to the federal law resolution agencies 
will be roughly three to four times larger than to the SPV.51 
                                                      
49 Bundesministerium der Finanzen, „Gesetz zur Fortentwicklung der 
Finanzmarktstabilisierung“22.7.09: 
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December 2008 are eligible for transfer to an agency. Agencies are created 
by the FMSA upon request from a transferring company, but are legally, 
economically, and organisationally independent from the FMSA. In being 
independent, agencies must use accounting rules under the German 
Commercial Code.52  
Last, there are differences in the way SPV and agencies may obtain 
transferred assets. First, assets may be moved to Agencies through 
individual transfers. Second, assets may be moved through a re-
organisation (spin-off or hive-down). Last, economic transfer is permitted 
whereby agencies can offer guarantees without obtaining any assets 
through a legal transfer.53  
State law resolution agencies model 
The state law resolution agency works similarly to the federal law agency. 
The basic principle is to provide banks in each state asset relief 
opportunities at the state level similar to those offered at the federal level. 
The state agency is supervised by the German Federal Financial 
Supervisory Authority as well as by the authorities of the federal states. 
Legally, there is no institutional connection between the FMSA and the 
state agencies.54 
Commission approval 
The asset relief scheme was approved on 31 July 2009. The mechanism was 
said to meet the Commission’s Commission's Guidance Communication on 
the treatment of impaired assets. Specifically, the scheme provides ex ante 
transparency and disclosure of impairments, valuation of the assets based 
on their real economic value, a burden-sharing of the costs related to the 
                                                      
52 Bundesministerium der Finanzen, „Gesetz zur Fortentwicklung der 
Finanzmarktstabilisierung“22.7.09: 
http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/nn_67366/DE/ 
BMF__Startseite/node.html?__nnn=true  
53 Ibid. „Gesetz zur Fortentwicklung der Finanzmarktstabilisierung“, and 
supported by “German Bad Bank Act in Force“, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer 
Briefing (August 2009), p. 5. 
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operation and adequate remuneration. In addition, the scheme is limited in 
time and scope as the enrolment period for asset relief is limited to six 
months. 
In terms of transparency, the real economic value of the assets to be 
transferred is established by the financial institution prior to the asset relief 
measure. It is then assessed by independent experts and confirmed by the 
competent supervisory authority. Furthermore, the real economic value has 
to be published in the annual report of the beneficiary. 
Burden-sharing is ensured ex post through the beneficiary's obligation 
to pay the difference between the transfer value and the fundamental 
value. This payment is made in annual instalments. The payment 
requirement is in line with the EU requirements for the remuneration of 
recapitalisations.55 
 
                                                      
55 See DG Competition Website for all compliance information, 31.7.09: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1216&format=
HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en  
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ANNEX 5. STATE AID BY COUNTRY (UP TO END OCTOBER 2010) 
Country €bn  capital 
injections/ 
guarantees 
Tools/Legislation Eligible 
Institutions 
Conditionality Date  initially 
Approved by 
Commission 
Additional actions by the EU Commission – 
Action on specific cases 
Austria   C.I. 15 
Guar. 75 
Government to 
guarantee €75 billion 
in loans, inject up to 
€15 billion in capital, 
and allocate up to 
€10 billion to 
guarantee public 
savings  
Credit and 
insurance 
institutions 
Dividend restriction 
and a remuneration 
corridor 
10-Dec-08  25 June 2010 – Extension of guarantee scheme 
20 June 2010 –Approval of restructuring of 
BAWAG bank 
23 Dec 2009 –Authorisation of Hypo Group Alpe 
Adria (HGAA) rescue 
22 Dec 2009 – Provisional authorisation of 
€550 million capital injection and a €400 million 
guarantee for BAWAG bank 
17 December 2009 – Extension of guarantee 
scheme 
30 June 2009– Extension of guarantee scheme 
17 June 2009 – €100 million recapitalisation 
measure for Hypo Tirol 
Belgium   C.I. n/a 
Guar. n/a 
Guarantee begins 9 
October 2008 and 
finishes 31 October 
2009; Guarantees 
must be applied for 
between 9 October 
2008 and 31 October 
2009 
Any 
institution 
that is facing 
liquidity or 
insolvency 
problems that 
could have 
implications 
for the 
Belgian 
economy 
Firms must promise 
to use government 
aid to institute 
measures to improve 
the financial 
situation of their 
firm; the Minister of 
Finance determines 
the conditions of the 
guarantee, including 
issues of 
20-Nov-08   20 May 2010 – Approval of restructuring of 
insurance company Ethias  
26 February 2010 – Approval of restructuring plan 
for Dexia 
18 November 2009 – Approval of restructuring 
package for KBC foresees structural and financial 
restructuring through the divestment, run-down 
and listing of various businesses 
30 Oct 2009 – Authorisation of temporary 
prolongation of the guarantee jointly granted by 
Belgium, France and Luxembourg on the debt of BANK STATE AID IN THE FINANCIAL CRISIS | 71 
 
remuneration Dexia. 
30 June 2009 - €3.5 billion recapitalisation and 
temporary clearance for impaired asset relief, with 
final approval dependent on the result of an in-
depth investigation for KBC Group 
12 May 2009 – Commission approves additional 
aid from Belgium and Luxembourg for Fortis. The 
additional aid for Fortis was necessary to allow the 
sale of the bank to BNP Paribas to proceed 
13 Mar 2009 – Commission to investigate if state 
aid to Dexia will be accompanied by “realistic 
projects” to address the bank’s problems 
12 Feb 2009 – Approval of €1.5 capital injection for 
insurance and banking group Ethias 
18 Dec 2008 – Approval of €3.5 billion recap for 
KBC Group 
3 Dec 2008 - Commission clears state aid to rescue 
and restructure Fortis Bank and Fortis Bank 
Luxemburg 
20 Nov 2008 – Approval of guarantee of short and 
medium term wholesale funding for Fortis in joint 
aid from BE, LU, FR 
20 Nov 2008 – Approval of state guarantee for 
Dexia from BE, LU, FR 
Denmark   C.I. n/a 
Guar. n/a  
Guarantee scheme; 
bank wind-up 
scheme 
All banks in 
Denmark that 
have a 
banking 
license and 
participate in 
the Sector 
Fund 
Limited to 
fundamentally 
sound financial 
institutions; banks 
pay premium to 
remunerate debt 
guarantee; insolvent 
banks to be wound 
10-Oct-08   25 October 2010 – Approval of measures to 
liquidate Fionia Bank 
30 September 2010 –Bad bank scheme authorised 
30 June 2010 – Extension of guarantee scheme 
17 December 2009 – Extension of guarantee 
scheme (but not of recap. scheme) 
17 August 2009 – Extension of guarantee and 72 | ANNEXES 
 
up using private 
funds when possible 
recap. scheme 
20 May 2009 – Approval of credit facility of up to 
€685 million and a €134 million capital injection for 
Fionia Bank 
3 Feb 2009 - €13.5 billion recap scheme; 
amendments to existing guarantee scheme to 
allow integration of individual guarantees on new 
loans for up to three years 
5 Nov 2008 – Approval of liquidation aid from 
DNB and DPB for Roskilde Bank. Package 
includes €1.3 billion loan takeover and €670 
million deposits takeover plus sales of parts of the 
bank 
 
Finland   C.I. 4 
Guar. 50 
Guarantee to cover, 
against 
remuneration, the 
issuance of new 
short and medium 
term non-
subordinated debt 
between 90 days and 
three years. Five 
year maturity for 
mortgage-backed 
bonds only. 
All solvent 
Finnish 
deposit and 
mortgage 
banks, 
including 
Finnish 
subsidiaries 
of foreign 
banks 
Restrictions on 
beneficiaries' balance 
sheet growth with 
regard to national 
and EU averages, 
limitations on 
expansion and 
marketing and strict 
conditions for staff 
remuneration or 
bonus payments 
14-Nov-08   17 Dec 2009 – Extension of guarantee scheme 
30 Apr 2009 – Prolongation/modification of 
Scheme. Guarantees may be issued until 31 Dec 
2009; guarantee now covers instruments of up to a 
5 yr maturity 
21 Jan 2009 - Nordea Bank Finland plc, OP-Pohjola 
Group Central Cooperative and Sampo Bank plc, 
and a special purpose vehicle took over the credit 
claims and other assets of Kaupthing Bank h.f. and 
settled all the deposit claims in Finland. The 
Finnish State provided a guarantee to the 
participants, to cover potential economic losses. 
 
France   C.I. 40 
Guar. 360 
€40 billion capital 
injection into 
France's banks; Bank 
Debt guarantee of 
€360 billion 
All French 
financial 
institutions 
Cap on 
remunerations; 
banks will have to 
provide monthly 
reports on capital 
31-Oct-08   12 May 2009 - Extension of the refinancing scheme 
for credit institutions in France 
8 May 2009 – Approval of 2.45 billion capital 
injection into the institution to be created by the 
merger between the Caisse d’Épargne and Banque BANK STATE AID IN THE FINANCIAL CRISIS | 73 
 
use. Firms will also 
have to sign a 'code 
of ethics' 
Populaire groups 
24 Mar 2009 – Scheme amendment. French scheme 
to encourage beneficiary banks to buy back 
preferred shares as early as possible by making the 
payback amount increase over time 
8 Dec 2008 – Approval of €21 billion French capital 
injection scheme 
Germany   C.I. 80 
Guar. 400 
€400 billion in loan 
guarantees; can give 
further €80 billion in 
loans; €20 billion to 
cover potential 
losses from loans  
Credit 
institutions, 
financial 
service 
providers, 
insurance 
companies 
and pension 
funds, 
operators of 
securities and 
commodities 
exchanges 
Restrictions on 
remuneration for 
upper management; 
capital requirements; 
distribution of 
dividends; reporting 
requirements 
27-Oct-08   22 Dec 2009 - Commission temporarily approves 
urgent rescue aid for WestLB; opens in-depth 
investigation into bad bank. The bad bank will 
take over €85.1 billion in toxic assets. WestLB is 
receiving capital of €3 billion from Germany 
(SoFFin) 
21 Dec 2009 – Commission temporarily approves 
two state guarantees of €8 billion and €10 billion 
respectively for German bank Hypo Real Estate 
17 Dec 2009 –Prolongation of guarantee scheme 
15 Dec 2009 – Approval of Landesbank Baden 
Württemberg restructuring plan and impaired 
assets relief measure 
23 Oct 2009 - Commission opens in-depth 
investigation into aid package for German HSH 
Nordbank AG 
7 Oct 2009 - temporary increase of the guarantee 
for a portfolio of securities of German Landesbank 
WestLB. 
17 Aug 2009 – Approval of guarantees amounting 
up to €7 billion to the German bank IKB 
31 July 2009 - Commission approves German asset 
relief scheme 
30 June 2009 – Approval of temporary clearance to 
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provided to Landesbank Baden-Württemberg 
22 June 2009 – Prolongation of guarantee scheme 
12 May 2009 - Commission opens in-depth 
investigation into aid package for German 
Landesbank BayernLB and its Austrian subsidiary 
Hypo Group Alpe Adria  
12 May 2009 –€5 billion risk shield for German 
bank WestLB 
7 May 2009 - €10 billion recap to Commerzbank 
(the bank received €8 billion in Dec 2008) 
7 May 2009 - In-depth investigation into aid 
package for German bank Hypo Real Estate 
22 Jan 2009 - €6.7 billion guarantee for SdB (for 
bond refinancing) 
23 Dec 2008 – Approval of guarantee package for 
NordLB and IKB 
18 Dec 2008 – Approval of capital injection and a 
risk shield for BayernLB 
12 Dec 2008 – Amendments to remuneration of 
recapitalisation measures (price for the state 
participation increases in proportion to its 
duration to encourage quick payback by users) 
21 Oct 2008 – Approval of €9 billion restructuring 
package for IKB. Two risk shields, capital 
injections and liquidity facilities 
2 Oct 2008 - Approval of loan guarantees totalling 
€35 billion for Hypo Real Estate Holding AG BANK STATE AID IN THE FINANCIAL CRISIS | 75 
 
Greece   C.I. 5 
Guar. 15 
State to buy non-
core tier 1 preference 
shares; guarantee 
scheme for debt 
between 3 months 
and 3 years; 
securities scheme, 
government bonds 
lent against bank 
collateral 
All 
financially 
sound credit 
institutions 
licensed in 
Greece 
Beneficiaries to pay a 
market-oriented 
remuneration  
19-Nov-08   30 June 2010 – Guarantee Scheme extended 
25 January 2010 – Guarantee Scheme extended 
18 September 2009 –Guarantee Scheme extended 
19 Nov 2008 – Approval of plan to provide 
financial institutions new capital and securities 
which can be converted into liquidity with the 
ECB; and guarantees on short and medium term 
newly issued debt 
Hungary   C.I. 2 
Guar. 2 
Provide eligible 
credit institutions 
with new capital and 
guarantees on short 
and medium term 
newly issued debt 
Open to all 
credit 
institutions of 
systemic 
importance 
on the 
Hungarian 
banking 
market 
Beneficiaries to pay a 
market-oriented 
remuneration; 
measures target only 
fundamentally 
sound financial 
institutions 
 
12-Feb-09  14 Jan 2010 – Approval of Hungarian liquidity 
support scheme 
17 Dec 2009 – Extension of recap. scheme 
3 Sept 2009 – Extension of guarantee and recap. 
scheme 
11 Mar 2009 – Approval of government grants in 
the form of guarantees for investment and 
working capital credit 
Ireland   Guar. n/a  Covers all existing 
and new facilities 
issued from 29 
September 2008 to 28 
September 2010  
Banks with a 
systemic 
relevance for 
the Irish 
economy 
Firm will be subject 
to specific terms and 
conditions so that 
the taxpayers' 
interest can be 
protected 
13-Oct-08   21 September 2010 – Guarantee Scheme of Irish 
financial institutions prolonged 
10 August 2010 – Commission temporarily clears 
support for Anglo-Irish Bank 
2 June 2010 – Recapitalisation of EBS (building 
society)  
26 Feb 2010 - Commission approves Irish impaired 
asset relief scheme NAMA 
20 Nov 2009 - Commission approves revised Irish 
guarantee scheme, providing guarantees on 
deposits and debt to eligible banks active on the 
Irish market. Limits on time and scope 
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€4 billion for Anglo Irish Bank 
12 May 2009 - recapitalisation worth €3.5 billion 
Allied Irish Bank 
26 Mar 2009 – €3.5 billion recapitalisation of Bank 
of Ireland 
17 Feb 2009 – Nationalisation of Anglo-Irish Bank 
14 Jan 2009 - €1.5 billion recap of Anglo-Irish Bank 
Italy   C.I. n/a 
Guar. n/a 
Guarantee on new 
liabilities between 3 
months and 5 years; 
6 month renewable 
swap scheme 
between matching 
bank debt certificates 
and Treasury bills 
(40 billion cap); state 
guarantee for third 
parties borrowing 
from banks 
Solvent 
banks 
authorised in 
Italy, 
including the 
subsidiaries 
of foreign 
groups 
The total amount of 
guarantees issued 
with a maturity of 
more than three 
years will not exceed 
25% of the total 
amount covered. 
Italy will monitor 
that the total amount 
to be received by a 
bank does not 
exceed certain pre-
defined thresholds 
14-Nov-08   16 June 2009 - Extension of the guarantee scheme 
for banks 
20 Feb 2009 –Approval of amendment to recap. 
scheme with an alternative remuneration option 
(higher initial coupon and a higher annual coupon 
level) in exchange of a lower reimbursement price 
23 Dec 2008 – Commission approves recap scheme 
for Italian banks worth €15-€20 billion (subscribe 
subordinated debt instruments) 
Latvia   C.I. n/a 
Guar. n/a  
Guarantee scheme 
covering all 
liabilities with the 
exception of inter-
bank deposits, 
subordinated 
liabilities and 
collateralised 
liabilities such as 
covered bonds 
Open to all 
solvent 
Latvian 
banks, 
including 
Latvian 
subsidiaries 
of foreign 
banks 
Subject to 
behavioural 
commitments to 
avoid an abusive use 
of the state support. 
These include 
limitations on 
marketing and 
conditions for staff 
remuneration or 
bonus payments 
22-Dec-08  15 September 2010 – Commission clears 
restructuring of Parex Bank 
25 June 2010 – Extension of guarantee scheme 
17 Dec 2009 – Extension of guarantee scheme  
19 Nov 2009 - Commission approves €103 million 
capital injections for 'Mortgage and Land Bank of 
Latvia' 
27 July 2009 - In-depth investigation into state 
support measures for the Latvian JSC Parex Banka. 
11 May 2009 – Government to acquire newly 
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debt. 
25 Nov 2008 – Approval of state guarantee 
covering certain existing and new loans for JSC 
Parex Banka 
10 Nov 2008 – Government of Latvia Nationalizes 
Parex Banka 
Lithuan.  C.I. n/a 
Guar. n/a  
Guarantee, 
recapitalisation and 
asset relief scheme 
Open to all 
credit 
institutions 
and branches 
operating in 
the Lithuan. 
market 
Market-oriented 
remuneration 
5-August-2010   
Nether.  C.I. 20 
Guar. 200 
Guarantees for 
unsecured loans. 
Any 
institution 
defined as a 
bank and 
having its 
corporate 
domicile in 
NL; 
 has 
substantial 
business in 
the 
Netherlands, 
and an 
acceptable 
solvency 
ratio 
Guaranteed debt 
instruments are 
subject to a fee of 50 
basis points if the 
tenure is no more 
than one year, and 
50 basis points and 
the 5 year average if 
more than one year; 
remuneration 
restrictions 
31-Oct-08   17 August 2010 –Approval of recap. of AEGON 
30 June 2010 –Guarantee scheme extended 
8 Feb 2010 – Commission temporarily approves 
recapitalisation package of €6.9 billion in favour of 
ABN AMRO and Fortis Bank Nederland 
28 Jan 2010 –Approval of recap. of SNS Reaal 
17 December 2009 – Extension of guarantee 
scheme 
18 Nov 2009 - Commission approves ING 
restructuring plan and illiquid asset back-up 
facility 
7 July 2009 – Extension of guarantee scheme 
8 Apr 2009 –Investigation into state aid to Fortis 
Bank Netherlands and ABN Amro 
31 Mar 2009 – Commission temporarily authorizes 
illiquid asset back up facility for ING for six 
months. 
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SNS REAAL  
27 Nov 2008 – Approval of Aegon recapitalisation 
with €3 billion through a special type of securities 
13 Nov 2008 – Approval of a €10 billion special 
securities recap. scheme for ING 
Poland   C.I.  
Guar.  
Guarantee short and 
medium term debt 
to encourage inter-
bank lending and 
offer liquidity to 
financial institutions 
Unclear “Strict  conditions” 
for recipients. 
Eligible institutions 
may apply for the 
support under the 
scheme until 31 
December 2009, but 
support may be 
granted later, within 
the six month period 
as from the day of 
the adoption of this 
decision 
25-Sept-09   30 June 2010 – Extension of support scheme 
9 February 2010 – Extension of support scheme 
21 Dec 2009 - Commission approves Polish bank 
recapitalisation scheme 
Portugal   C.I. 4 
Guar. 20 
State guarantees for 
financing 
agreements and the 
emission of non 
subordinated short 
and medium term 
debt.  
All banks 
incorporated 
in Portugal 
The beneficiary who 
has called on a 
guarantee has to 
reimburse the state 
in full, either by 
paying back the loan 
or by exchanging it 
for preferential 
shares.  
30-Oct-08   23 July 2010 – Bank support scheme extended 
23 July 2010 – Commission orders recovery of 
illegal state aid from Banco Privado Português 
20 May 2009 – Approval of Portuguese €4 billion 
recap scheme for banks  
13 Mar 2009 – Commission approves underwriting 
of a €450 million loan to Banco Privado Portugues 
by six Portuguese banks 
Slovakia   capital  injections  and 
guarantees to 
eligible financial 
institutions 
systemically 
relevant 
banks 
incorporated 
in Slovakia, 
Limits on time and 
scope 
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including 
subsidiaries 
of foreign 
financial 
institutions 
Slovenia   Guar. 12  The state guarantee 
covers, against 
remuneration, the 
issuance of new 
short and medium 
term non-
subordinated debt 
with a maturity 
between 90 days and 
five years. 
Solvent credit 
institutions, 
insurance, 
reinsurance, 
and pension 
companies 
are allowed 
to enter the 
scheme. 
Beneficiaries will be 
subject to 
behavioural 
commitments to 
avoid an abusive use 
of the state support 
12-Dec-2008   30 June 2010 – Extension of guarantee scheme 
17 December 2009 – Extension of guarantee 
scheme 
22 June 2009 – Extension of guarantee scheme 
20 Mar 2009 - State aid liquidity scheme to eligible 
financial institutions approved 
12 Dec 2008 – Approval of guarantee scheme for 
credit institutions for non-subordinated debt with 
a maturity between 90 days and 5 years 
Spain   C.I. 50  
Guar. 100 
 
€100 billion in state 
guarantees; €30 
billion - €50 billion 
to buy 'healthy 
assets' from banks.  
All Spanish 
financial 
institutions 
Government can 
only purchase AAA 
rated bonds; AA 
bonds can be 
purchased if banks 
agree to repurchase 
those bonds at a 
fixed price on a fixed 
date 
04-Nov-08  23 July 2010 – Bank support scheme extended  
29 June 2010 –Approval of restructuring aid for 
Caja Castilla La Mancha 
28 June 2010 – Bank guarantee scheme extended 
28 Jan 2010 - Commission approves Spanish 
recapitalisation scheme (Fondo de 
Reestructuración Ordenada Bancaria (FROB)) 
23 Dec 2008 – Commission approves Guarantee 
scheme worth €100 billion (perhaps increased to 
€200 billion) that will include issuance of notes, 
bonds, and obligations 
4 Nov 2008 – Approval of fund for acquisition of 
assets from financial institutions 80 | ANNEXES 
 
Sweden  C.I. 4.68 
Guar. 140 
 
Guarantee scheme 
covering new 
issuances of short 
and medium term 
non-subordinated 
debt; recap scheme; 
state loans 
All solvent 
banks and 
mortgage 
institutions 
incorporated 
and 
operating in 
Sweden 
A limit on aggregate 
growth in balance 
sheet volume related 
to the guarantee, 
marketing 
restrictions, a 
prohibition to base 
significant expansion 
on the guarantee and 
restrictions related to 
staff remuneration 
30-Oct-2008  12 May 2010 – Clearance of Carnegie restructuring 
11 Feb 2009 – Approval of Swedish scheme to 
recapitalise banks 
28 Apr 2009 – Prolongation of Scheme until 31 Oct 
2009; uncollateralised debt instruments with a 
term of up to five years, whereas it previously 
covered only maturities of up to three years 
29 Jan 2009 – Commission approves modifications 
to Swedish support schemes for financial 
institutions. Cancellation of growth restrictions of 
participating banks; includes more mortgage 
institutions 
16 Dec 2008 – Emergency liquidity assistance 
worth €225 million for Carnegie Bank 
United 
Kingdom  
C.I. 57 
Guar. 286 
€57 billion recap; €55 
billion asset 
purchase; €286 
billion to guarantee 
loans 
All UK 
financial 
institutions 
Government will 
consider adjusting 
dividend policies 
and executive 
compensation 
13-Oct-08   25 Jan 2010 – Approval of aid for restructuring of 
Dunfermline Building Society 
25 Jan 2010 – Approval of liquidation of Bradford 
& Bingley 
17 Dec 2009 – Extension of recapitalisation and 
guarantee scheme 
14 Dec 2009 – Commission approves impaired 
asset relief measure and restructuring plan of 
Royal Bank of Scotland 
18 Nov 2009 – Commission approves restructuring 
plan of Lloyds Banking Group 
28 Oct 2009 – Approval of restructuring package 
for Northern Rock. The bank will be split into a 
'good' bank that will continue the economic 
activities of Northern Rock and a ‘bad’ bank, an 
asset management company that will liquidate the 
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13 Oct 2009 – Extension of guarantee scheme 
7 May 2009 – Commission extends in-depth 
investigation into UK aid package for Northern 
Rock 
21 Apr 2009 – Approval of Asset backed Securities 
Guarantee scheme (special purpose vehicles 
collateralized with residential mortgages) of up to 
£50 billion (€57 billion). 
15 Apr 2009 – Extension of Credit Guarantee and 
recap schemes to 13 Oct 2009 
24 Mar 2009 – Working Capital Guarantee Scheme 
to offer banks €10 billion in guarantees for 
business loans 
23 Dec 2008 – Amendments to support scheme: 
guarantee debt instruments in foreign currencies; 
fee payable on guaranteed liabilities based on 50 
basis points plus 100% of median 5yr CDS; can 
now roll over scheme for two more years 
13 Oct 2008 – Lloyds Banking Group receives a 
state recapitalisation of £17 billion (some €19 
billion). The approval of this recapitalisation was 
conditional upon the submission of a restructuring 
plan. 
1 Oct 2008 – Commission approves UK rescue aid 
package for Bradford & Bingley 
2 Apr 2008 – Commission launches in-depth 
investigation into UK restructuring aid package 
for Northern Rock 
5 Dec 2007 – Commission approves UK rescue aid 
package for Northern Rock 
Source: DG Comp, EU Commission.  